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ABSTRACT 
The importance of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to warfighters has been 
growing.  Each loss (regardless of whether the entire UAS or parts of it) has become 
more expensive and unaffordable in both an operational and monetary sense.  An 
unmanned aircraft (UA) loss may mean that critical missions cannot be performed and 
millions of dollars of investments on the UA lost.  As most existing UAS were designed 
to be inexpensive and expendable, there is a need to enhance their combat survivability.  
Combat survivability is the capability of UAS to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile 
environment.  This thesis explored how to enhance the combat survivability of existing 
UAS.  Potential survivability enhancement options are identified.  These options include 
changes in tactics, improving the situation awareness of the operator, equipping the UA 
with the capability to counter an incoming threat, improving the payload performance, 
improving resistance of the data link to jamming.  The technology behind these options 
as well as the favorable and unfavorable factors of the options are studied and discussed.  
This thesis also proposed a process for selecting the “best” solution from survivability 
enhancement alternatives.  This thesis used systems engineering methodology to enhance 
the survivability of existing UAS. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The importance of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to warfighters has been 
growing as the sphere of UAS combat applications keeps increasing.  In the past, UAS 
advocates gave minimal consideration to survivability with the view that UAS were to be 
inexpensive and expendable.  Most current unmanned aircrafts (UA) are likely designed 
to be simple, require minimal number of components, and be as light as possible.  
However, as the dependence of modern warfighting units on UAS increases, the 
consequences of occasional disruptive losses become more severe.  Also with today’s 
high unit cost of UAS, UAS can no longer be considered inexpensive.  Each loss 
becomes more expensive and unaffordable in both operational and monetary sense.  
Combat survivability of UAS, therefore, needs to be enhanced.  This improvement should 
be done with minimal cost and penalty to the performance of UAS. 
This thesis acts as a guide to enhancing survivability of existing UAS by 
describing (1) the functions required to enhance combat survivability of UAS, (2) the 
major components of a UAS and its missions, (3) the threats that a UAS will likely 
encounter, (4) UAS weaknesses, (5) potential survivability enhancement options, and (6) 
a process to determine the need to enhance combat survivability of an existing UAS and 
select the “best” solution. 
A functional analysis of “to enhance combat survivability of UAS” was 
performed.  The identified functions required to enhance combat survivability of UAS are 
1) do not move into the threat area, 2) prevent threat from operating, 3) prevent threat 
from detecting, identifying and classifying UAS, 4) prevent threat from obtaining a firing 
solution, 5) prevent threat damage mechanism from reaching the UAS, 6) increase UAS 




Figure 1.   Functional Decomposition of “To Enhance Combat Survivability of UAS.” 
 
Each of these functions could be achieved by numerous other sub-functions or 
concepts.  These concepts are 1) gather intelligence about threat, 2) warn about presence 
of threat, 3) increase stand-off range, 4) improve system performance, 5) suppress threat, 
6) reduce signature of UAS, 7) jam or deceive threat sensor, 8) enhance tactics and 
training, 9) improve system performance, 10) distract threat propagator using 
expendables, 11) suppress damage, 12) install redundant components (with separation), 
13) locate critical components in a way that reduce probability of the damage from killing 
UAS, 14) shield critical components, and 15) eliminate components.  These concepts 
produce survivability enhancement options that can be considered. 
A physical decomposition of UAS and a functional analysis of “UAS performing 
reconnaissance operations” were performed.  The results were combined to identify UAS 
weaknesses.  The weaknesses include components having large RCS or high IR 
signature, having communication system and payload that are susceptible to jamming, 
having components that are software-driven and susceptible to software virus attack, and 
degradation of some functions related to mission planning would lead to UAS 
destruction.  The adversary can exploit these weaknesses to detect, identify, and track 
 xxi
UAS or attack the weaknesses to destroy it.  Combat survivability enhancement options 
were identified to ameliorate or eliminate these weaknesses. 
Some of the survivability enhancement options include increasing the operating 
altitude of UAs, changing the UA’s operating speed, installing warning systems and/or 
electronic countermeasures, improving payload performance, improving the data link 
(such as reducing its probability of interception), and improving human factor issues in 
UAS.  The technology behind the options as well as the favorable and unfavorable factors 
of the key options were studied and discussed. 
The thesis concludes by proposing a process that can be used to determine the 
need to enhance the combat survivability of an existing UAS, and once the need is 
established, select the “best” solution.  The process starts with establishing the need for 
enhancing combat survivability of UAS.  The need is dependent upon many factors that 
includes the types of mission to be accomplished, the criticality of these mission(s), the 
threats encountered by UAS in its operating environment, and the number of UAS 
available, taking into account the UA as well as the payload.  Once the need is 
established, the next step is to perform a feasibility analysis.  The analysis involves (1) 
identifying possible top-level approaches that can meet the need; (2) evaluating the 
approaches in terms of effectiveness, impact on the existing UAS,  maintenance and 
sustaining support requirements, associated risk (technological, schedule, program, etc.), 
and life-cycle costs; and (3) selecting the preferred approach.  After the feasibility 
analysis is done, the next step is to identify objectives and define the requirements for 
enhancing combat survivability.  This is followed by performing a functional analysis to 
identify all the resources (or physical components) necessary for the system to 
accomplish its mission.  The functional analysis is followed by mapping all functions to 
physical components and allocating requirements to each component.  Potential combat 
survivability enhancement solutions are then identified and evaluated based on (1) 
effectiveness of the solution; (2) how the solution will affect UAS performance, 
reliability, maintainability, supportability and system safety; (3) cost of the solution; and 
(4) schedule.  The “best” combat survivability enhancement solution is then selected.  
The definition of “best” depends on the customer’s top criteria for enhancing UAS 
 xxii
combat survivability.  The customer may be asking for the most cost-effective solution, 
the solution with the least operational impact to the existing system, the solution with 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)1, more commonly known as Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Systems, first became a recognized system when a Curtiss-Sperry 
Aerial Torpedo (also known as “Curtis-Sperry Flying Bomb”, shown in Figure 2) became 
the first powered unmanned aircraft to fly on March 6, 1918 [1].  The U.S. Navy (USN) 
started the aerial “torpedo” program during World War One (WWI) for use against 
German U-boat bases and munitions factories from distances of up to 100 miles. 
 
Figure 2.   A Curtiss-Sperry Aerial Torpedo [From 2]. 
 
The first use of UAS in combat by the U.S., however, was during WWII.  TDR-1 
assault drones (shown in Figure 3) were used as aerial bombs and to drop bombs on 
Japanese positions in the Pacific.  During its short operation life of two months, three out 
of fifty aircraft were lost to hostile fire. 
                                                 
1 With efforts underway to develop rules integrating UAS’s into the National Airspace System, and realizing 
that Federal Aviation Administration rule-making authority applied only to "aircraft," the term Remotely Operated 
Aircraft (ROA) was coined in 1997 to ensure unmanned aerial vehicles (the old term) were covered under FAA's 
statutory language.  This was changed in 2004 when the FAA (and DoD) adopted the more inclusive term Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS).  The FAA had adopted the acronym UAS to reflect the fact that these complex systems include 
ground stations and other elements besides the actual unmanned aircrafts. 
 2
 
Figure 3.   A TDR-1 Carrying a Torpedo Underneath Its Fuselage [From 3]. 
 
Over the years, the roles of UAS have evolved from being “flying bombs” to 
flying targets, then to decoys followed by reconnaissance platforms, and recently, firing 
platforms.  The importance of UAS to warfighters has been growing as the sphere of 
UAS combat applications keeps increasing.  Reports from the war in Afghanistan point to 
UAS as one of three principal contributors to the success of the U.S. campaign to root out 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist elements [4].  The growing importance of UAS is 
exemplified by the increased flying hours of the MQ-1 Predator.  The Predator 
accumulated 250,000 flying hours on June 22, 2007, 12 years after becoming operational, 
but surpassed 300,000 flying hours six months later and is expected to surpass 500,000 
flying hours before the end of 2009 [5]. 
In the past, UAS advocates gave minimal consideration to survivability with the 
view being that UAS were to be inexpensive and expendable.  Most existing unmanned 
aircraft (UA) are likely designed to be simple [6], require minimal number of 
components, and be as light as possible.  Fuel tanks are typically non-self-sealing, as such 
tanks are heavier.  UAs are not equipped with fire detection and suppression systems, and 
most parts of UAs are not ballistic-hardened as this increases cost and weight, and 
reduces range and endurance. 
From 1991 to 2003, 185 UA losses were recorded, an average of 14.2 per year.  
Of these, 18 RQ-2 Pioneer UAs were lost in combat during Desert Storm (1991) over a 
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period of less than a year while another two were lost due to non-combat reasons in the 
same period.  During Operation Allied Force (1999), 26 UAs of various types were lost 
to hostile fire.  UA loss rates during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were an average of 2.0 combat losses per year over the 2001-2003 
period [7]. 
From 1990 to 2002, 17 U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft were lost in combat.  Of 
these, 14 were lost during Desert Storm, three were lost during Operation Allied Force, 
and no aircraft lost during OEF and OIF [8].  When these figures are compared with 
those of UAs, a stark difference can be observed.  There is no doubt that with human 
crew onboard, the emphasis on manned aircraft survivability is much greater than that for 
unmanned aircraft.  For example, the USN requires all its modern aircraft to have more 
than one engine to ensure their survivability over large open waters, but in the case of 
Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (UCAS), however, the USN has no such 
requirement. 
As the dependence of modern warfighting units on UAS increases, the 
consequences of occasional losses have become more severe.  A unit may lose track of 
the high-value target it is following if the data link between the UA and its ground control 
station is jammed.  Thus, important intelligence cannot be gathered before the ground 
force engage its adversary as reconnaissance data from the UA has been denied. 
Also with the high unit cost of UAS, UAS can no longer be considered 
inexpensive.  A MQ-1 Predator UAS (includes four aircraft, ground control stations, and 
Predator Primary Satellite Link) costs $30.5 million (fiscal 1997 dollars) [9].  Each loss 
has become more expensive and unaffordable in both operational and monetary sense.  
Survivability should be included in UAS design, with minimal cost and penalty to the 
performance of UAS. 
A survivability study sponsored jointly by the U.S. National Defense Industry 
Association and the U.S. Navy supported the need for survivability considerations in 
UAS design.  The study showed that savings in survivability would outweigh cost of 
fitting systems with survivability features [10].  However, as many existing UAS are 
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designed without any (or minimal) consideration for survivability, there is a need to 
enhance the survivability of these systems. 
B. PURPOSE 
Following a systems engineering methodology, this thesis explored how combat 
survivability of existing UAS can be enhanced by (1) examining the weaknesses of UAS 
(with reference to combat survivability), and (2) what combat survivability enhancement 
options are available.  It also proposed a process for selecting the “best” solution from 
survivability enhancement alternatives. 
Even with the focus on existing UAS, many of the solutions identified can also be 
applied to future UAS survivability designs.  As many survivability advocates have 
observed, it is less expensive to build survivability in the initial design than to retrofit. 
The emphasis is to make UAS survivable in a man-made hostile environment 
(combat survivability), with the focus on preventing the adversary from killing UAS. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions were used to guide the research.  This thesis addressed the 
following questions: 
• What are the survivability enhancement concepts? 
• What are the weaknesses of UAS (with reference to combat 
survivability)? 
• How does one enhance combat survivability of an existing UAS? 
D. SCOPE 
The thesis was scoped to combat survivability of existing UAS.  Combat 
survivability is defined as the capability of a system, including its crew, to avoid or 
withstand a man-made hostile environment.  As surviving implies not getting killed, this 
thesis will focused on how the adversary can be prevented from killing UAS even though 




The methodology used to develop this thesis was based on the systems 
engineering (SE) process.  A generic SE process from the fourth edition of Systems 
Engineering and Analysis by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2006) was adapted to guide this 
work.  Beginning with the stated need to protect expensive, important UAS; the problem 
(focus of this thesis) was defined; then a functional analysis was performed to identify 
and partition system functions.  The following discussion outlines the eleven-steps 
methodology.  
1. Define Problem 
The problem studied in this thesis centered on enhancement of combat 
survivability of existing UAS.  The premise was that combat survivability of existing 
UAS can be enhanced.  While this thesis included the entire UAS for research, the 
emphasis was primarily on the unmanned aircraft (UA) as, due to the nature of its 
missions, it is most frequently exposed to the adversary. 
2. Functional Analysis of Adversary Wanting to Affect UAS Mission 
Effectiveness 
This is the first step to understanding combat survivability.  The objective of an 
adversary is to affect mission effectiveness of UAS.  A functional analysis was performed 
to discover the system functions that affected combat survivability of UAS. 
3. Develop the Kill Chain 
Among the many functions the adversary can perform to affect UAS mission 
effectiveness the most provocative is to kill UAS.  A functional analysis was performed 
to identify functions required in order to kill UAS.  In particular, these functions formed 
the functional kill chain.  The functional kill chain is defined as the sequence of functions 
involved in the successful prosecution of operations that are impacted sufficiently to 
result in the complete degradation of mission capability [11].  If the functional kill chain 
is broken, the UAS will not be killed.  The kill chain was, therefore, used as the basis to 
perform the functional analysis on enhancing combat survivability. 
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4. Perform a Functional Analysis on Enhancing Combat Survivability of 
UAS 
A functional analysis on enhancing combat survivability of UAS was performed 
to identify the functions required to enhance combat survivability (i.e., reduce the 
probability of kill).  Functions that disrupt the kill chain are also functions that can 
enhance combat survivability. 
5. Define Concepts that Can Be Used to Achieve Combat Survivability 
Concepts that can be used to achieve combat survivability were then developed 
from combat survivability enhancement functions identified earlier.  The concepts are 
top-level design principles that can achieve the combat survivability functions identified 
earlier.  These concepts were used to aid the identification of survivability enhancement 
options later in the research. 
6. Perform Physical Decomposition of UAS 
A physical decomposition of UAS was performed to identify the corporeal 
components of a UAS.  Many of these components offer emissions, reflections, or 
interactions with other objects which may provide signatures that can be exploited by the 
adversary to detect, identify, and track UAS.  Any degradation in these components may 
also degrade the mission, which in turn may even lead to the destruction or complete 
degradation of parts or subsystems (or possibly the entire UAS).  Results from the 
decomposition were used to identify UAS weaknesses. 
7. Perform Functional Analysis of the Top Priority Mission 
Surveys from combatant commanders (COCOM) and military departments 
identified the top priority mission by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The 
mission was used as a proxy to understand the functions required to perform UAS 
operations.  A functional analysis of the top priority mission (reconnaissance) was 
performed to identify the major functions that must be performed.  Even though this 
functional analysis was based on a single UA performing this mission, many of the 
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functions identified are also applicable when UAS is performing other mission types.  
Any degradation in these functions can limit UAS performance which may lead to the 
destruction of parts of UAS, or possibly the entire UAS. 
8. Identify Potential Threats to UAS 
In order to design the right combat survivability enhancement for UAS, potential 
threats were identified.  This was done by postulating scenarios and identifying and 
extracting the threats to the entire UAS or its subsystems. 
9. Identify UAS Weakness (With Reference To Combat Survivability) 
UAS components were combined with system functions and the threats to identify 
UAS weaknesses (in terms of combat survivability).  Components were identified from 
physical decomposition, functions were described through functional analysis of the top 
priority mission, and threats were characterized from scenarios.  UAS components and 
functions that can either be exploited by threats to detect UAS, or when disrupted will 
result in UAS being destroyed, are UAS weaknesses.  If the weaknesses are ameliorated 
or eliminated, combat survivability of UAS can be improved. 
10. Determine Survivability Enhancement Options 
Using combat survivability enhancement concepts, survivability enhancement 
options were determined.  Due to the wide-ranging characteristics of UAS, no “one size 
fits all” solution2 is available.  The pros and cons of these options were discussed. 
11. Develop Selection Process 
While enhancing the combat survivability of UAS, a balance between UAS 
survivability and satisfying its other requirements (mission requirement, being 
inexpensive, etc.) must be maintained.  A process is required to help select the “best” 
combat survivability enhancement solution.  A selection process based on SE 
methodology was proposed at the end of this thesis. 
                                                 
2 A combat survivability enhancement solution may consist of more than one enhancement option. 
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F. THESIS FLOW 
The thesis consists of eight chapters.  Chapter I provides the background of this 
thesis, along with the scope and methodology used.  Chapter II discusses what combat 
survivability is and identifies combat survivability enhancement concepts.  Combat 
survivability enhancement options identified later in the thesis are based on these 
concepts. 
Chapter III provides an overview of UAS and identifies the top priority UAS 
mission and functions required to perform the mission.  Chapter IV identifies potential 
threats to UAS.  Chapter V identifies and discusses UAS weaknesses (with reference to 
combat survivability).  These weaknesses are to be ameliorated or eliminated by the 
combat survivability enhancement options identified in the next chapter. 
Chapter VI identifies and discusses the combat survivability enhancement options 
available.  The chapter also discusses the possibility of a “one size fits all” solution to 
enhance combat survivability of existing UAS.  Chapter VII proposes a selection process 
that can used to determine the need to enhance the survivability of an existing UAS and 
select an enhancement solution once the need is established.  It also includes an example 
to illustrate the process. 
Chapter VIII concludes the thesis. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided the rationale and overview of the thesis as well as the 
scope, benefits, and research methodology. 
 9
II.   COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
A. SURVIVABILITY, SYSTEM SAFETY, AND COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
Robert E. Ball, in his book The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability – 
Analysis and Design, Second Edition, defines survivability as the capability of a system 
to avoid or withstand hostile environments.  This definition includes both man-made and 
naturally occurring environments, such as lightning strikes, severe turbulences, and 
crashes [12].  The system safety discipline aims to minimize conditions (also known as 
hazards) that can lead to mishaps in natural or normal environments.  When applied 
together, the system safety and survivability disciplines attempt to maintain safe 
operation and maximize the survival of a system in all environments, in both peacetime 
and wartime [13]. 
Combat survivability has a tighter definition than survivability.  Combat 
survivability is defined as the capability of a system, including its crew, to avoid or 
withstand a man-made hostile environment.  Combat survivability is a function of both 
susceptibility and vulnerability.  Susceptibility is loosely defined as the inability of a 
system to avoid being hit in a hostile environment, whereas vulnerability is the inability 
of the system to withstand damage caused by the threat.  The system is killed when it is 
hit and unable to withstand damage from that hit.  Susceptibility and vulnerability can be 
measured by the probabilities of these events happening.  The probability of a system 
being killed (also known as “killability”) is therefore the product of the probability of the 
system being hit and the probability of the system succumbing to the damage.  
Mathematically, 
Probability of system surviving a hostile environment (combat survivability) = 1 – 
Probability of the system being hit (susceptibility) x Probability of the system 
succumbing to the damage (vulnerability). Figure 4 shows the relationship between 








The inability of a system to avoid being hit in a hostile environment is referred to 
as susceptibility [13].  The more likely the system will be hit by one or more damage 
mechanisms3 generated by a threat weapon, the more susceptible the system is.  
Susceptibility is measured by the probability of the system being hit. 
                                                 
3 Damage mechanism is the physical output of a weapon that causes damage to the target.  Examples 
of damage mechanisms for a warhead include metallic penetrators and fragments, incendiary particles, and 
air blasts [13]. 
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Susceptibility can be influenced by the following: 
• Threat level (dependent on, for example, threat capability and number of 
threats) 
• System design (for example performance, agility and system signature) 
• Utilization of survivability equipment (for example, countermeasures and 
threat warning) 
• Tactics employed (for example, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense and flying 
Nap-of-the-Earth) 
2. Vulnerability 
The inability of a system to withstand damage caused by a damage mechanism is 
referred to as vulnerability [13].  The more likely the system will be killed from the hit by 
the damage mechanism generated by a threat weapon, the greater the vulnerability of the 
system.  Vulnerability is measured as the probability of system kill given a hit. 
Vulnerability can be influenced by the following: 
• Lethality of threat weapon (for example, fragment size, blast energy) 
• System design and architecture (for example, location of components, 
redundancy) 
• Utilization of survivability equipment (for example, damage suppression) 
B. ADVERSARY’S OBJECTIVE 
The objective of an adversary is to reduce the effectiveness of UAS.  To 
understand how the adversary will reduce the effectiveness, a functional decomposition is 
performed.  The functional decomposition of the adversaries’ top requirement, i.e., 
“Reduce UAS Effectiveness” delineates the possible modes of disruption that can reduce 
the mission capabilities of UAS.  The defining levels of reduction are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   Functional Decomposition of Adversary Reducing UAS Effectiveness. 
 
As shown in Figure 5, the adversary can hide from UAS such that it cannot be 
located by the UAS.  As long as the UAS cannot locate the adversary, it cannot perform 
its mission.  The adversary can also prevent or disrupt the communication between the 
UAS and its supporting units or units it is supporting such that it cannot obtain important 
information required for its mission.  For example, if UAS is not able to communicate 
with the intelligence unit that is supporting it, the UAS commander may not be able to 
plan a flight route that keeps the UA safe from the adversary’s air defense.  The 
adversary can thus shoot down the UA before it reaches its target area. 
The adversary can also disrupt UAS logistic support such that UAS cannot 
perform its mission.  For example, if the unit transporting the fuel is killed before the fuel 




Another way the adversary can reduce effectiveness of UAS is to degrade its 
optimal mission parameters.  The adversary could patrol the target area in order to deny 
access to the UA.  By broadcasting false intelligence the adversary can ‘trick’ the UAS 
commanders into flying the UA to a different area.  The adversary can even attack and 
kill UAS. 
The last sub-function is of particular interest, as making UAS survivable in a 
man-made hostile environment (combat survivability) is to prevent the adversary from 
killing UAS.  This thesis is primarily concerned with preventing the adversary from 
killing UAS. 
C. ENHANCING COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
The single-shot kill chain starts from the adversary 1) deploying the threat sensor 
and becoming active and searching for UAS.  It is followed by 2) the sensor detecting 
UAS, identifying, and classifying the target.  The adversary will then 3) work out a firing 
solution, and 4) launch the threat propagator4 when ready.  The threat propagator will 
intercept UAS and 5) the damage mechanism from the threat propagator will be enacted.  
UAS is killed when 6) the damage mechanism overcomes UAS resistance or tolerance to 
destruction.  Figure 6 illustrates the kill chain.  A similar kill chain applies to multiple-
shot scenario.  In a multiple-shot scenario, events from three to six may occur multiple 
times. 
                                                 
4 The object that propagates the threat.  Gun-fired ballistic projectile from a gun or guided missile are 
examples of treat propagator. 
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Figure 6.   A Single Shot Kill Chain to Kill A UAS. 
 
Combat survivability can be enhanced by reducing the probability of any of the 
six events of the kill chain from happening.  For example, if the threat sensors are 
prevented from deploying, they cannot become active and therefore will not be able to 
detect UAS, much less kill UAS.  Also, if the damage mechanism cannot hit UAS, the 
UAS will not be killed.  Likewise, if the damage mechanism cannot overcome UAS 
resistance to damage, it cannot kill UAS.  Reducing susceptibility of UAS reduces the 
probability of the first five events of the kill chain from happening while reducing 
vulnerability reduces the probability of the last event from happening. 
Features that reduce susceptibility and vulnerability can be installed to perform 
functions that reduce susceptibility or vulnerability (and consequently enhance 
survivability).  A functional decomposition of enhancing combat survivability was 
performed to identify these functions.  This is presented in Figure 7. 
Threat Sensor 
deployed and 
searches for UAS 
Sensor detects UAS, 
identifies and 
classifies target











Figure 7.   Functional Decomposition of “To Enhance Combat Survivability of UAS.” 
 
There are seven general functions fundamental to survivability enhancement.  
These were expanded into concepts and applied to reduce susceptibility or vulnerability 
and listed in Table 1.  Each of these functions could be achieved by numerous other sub-
functions or concepts.  These concepts produce survivability enhancement options that 
can counter the threats (identified in Chapter IV).  These options were considered to 
improve existing UAS.  See Chapter VI. 
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Table 1.   Survivability Enhancement Functions 
FUNCTIONS ACHIEVED BY 
Reduce Susceptibility 
Do not move into threat area • Gather intelligence about threat 
• Warn about presence of threat 
• Increase stand-off range 
• Improve system performance 
Prevent threat from operating • Suppress threat 
Prevent threat from detecting, 
identifying, and classifying UAS 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Enhance tactics and training 
• Improve system performance 
Prevent threat from obtaining a 
firing solution 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Enhance tactics and training 
• Improve system performance 
Prevent threat damage mechanism 
from reaching UAS 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Distract threat propagator using 
expendables  
• Enhance tactics and training 
Reduce Vulnerability 
Increase damage tolerance • Suppress damage 
• Install redundant components (with 
separation) 
• Locate critical components in a way 
that reduce probability of the damage 
from killing UAS 
Increase damage resistance • Shield critical components 
• Eliminate components 
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1. Reducing Susceptibility 
Reducing susceptibility results from reducing the likelihood that the UAS will be 
hit in a hostile environment.  This reduction can be achieved by destroying or degrading 
(1) the threat’s capability to search for UAS, (2) detecting, identifying and classifying the 
UAS, (3) tracking and firing at the system, and (4) reducing the threat propagator’s 
likelihood of hitting the UAS (refer to Figure 6).  The susceptibility reduction concepts 
listed in Table 1 can be used to destroy or degrade a threat’s capability. 
a. Gather Intelligence about Threat 
Intelligence about the threat allows UAS commanders to better plan the 
mission to avoid or minimize contact with the threat.  For example, with the knowledge 
of adversary air defense emplacement, the commander can plan the UA’s flight route 
beyond the range of the adversary’s air defense radar search capability.  However, as the 
core function of gathering intelligence about the threat is performed by intelligence 
agencies beyond the purview of UAS, no further discussion will be presented in this 
thesis. 
b. Threat Warning 
Threat warning improves situational awareness.  Situational awareness 
involves the operator being aware of what is happening and understanding how the 
events and his actions will impact mission objectives.  If the system operator is made 
aware of the threat situation, he or she can adopt appropriate actions to reduce the 
likelihood of their UA being hit in a hostile environment.  For example, the knowledge of 
location, status and the capabilities of adversary’s threat system allows one to plan the 
mission around these threats.  The operator may launch countermeasures to thwart an 
approaching hostile. 
Equipment which embodies concepts that enable threat-warning includes 
Radar Warning Receivers (RWR), Missile Approach Warning Systems (MAWS), and an 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS, e.g., E-3 Sentry). 
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c. Increase Stand-off Range 
Payload capabilities have great impact on system survivability.  For 
example, a camera payload with a greater detection range allows the UA to survey the 
target area at a greater stand-off range without putting itself in danger. Greater payload 
capability improves survivability. 
d. Improve System Performance 
Improving system performance (speed, altitude, maneuverability, and 
agility) reduces susceptibility through system design.  The RQ-4 Global Hawk is 
designed to fly at 65,000 feet to minimize its exposure to most surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM).  Design of the RQ-4 is an example of reducing susceptibility through system 
performance.   
Reducing the UA speed to below the radar velocity gate may prevent the 
adversary from using his radar to detect the UA, thus improving its survivability. 
e. Threat Suppression 
Threat suppression refers to the act of putting down threats through force.  
It consists of actions to damage or destroy the threats.  This can be accomplished by the 
system firing self-defense weapons (like missiles, guns, or even inexpensive mini-
unmanned aircraft that will sacrifice themselves by ramming into the attacking threat) or 
having friendly supporting elements eliminate the threat.  Examples of threat suppression 
include artillery bombardment of the threat area, suppression of enemy air defense 
(SEAD), and taking over control of the threat system.  The elimination of threat reduces 
the susceptibility of the system to the threat to zero. 
f. Signature Reduction 
Threat systems typically detect, identify, and track its target using one or 
more the following eight sources of signatures: 1) radar echo, 2) infrared radiations, 3) 
visual radiation, 4) acoustic pressure, 5) magnetic fields, 6) gravitational anomalies, 7) 
electrostatic fields, and 8) scalar anomalies.  Reducing the detectability of these 
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signatures may degrade the ability of the threat system to detect the target.  These actions 
include reducing UAS signatures to levels lower than the threat sensor’s thresholds and 
reducing the system signatures to levels such that the system’s contrast with its 
background is low [13]. 
Table 2 contains some examples of UAS signature reduction methods. 
 
Table 2.   Some Signature Reduction Method. 
Signature Reduction Method 
Radar Echo • Reflect the radar signal away from receiving antenna 
• Absorb the radar signal by attenuation or interference 
Infrared Radiation • Reduce the temperature of hot components 
• Reduce the temperature of exhausts 
• Reduce or mask surface radiating areas 
Visual Radiation • Camouflage 
• Reduce glitter 
Acoustic Pressure • Direct acoustic pressure away from threat sensors 
• Reduce power level of noise 
g. Jamming and Deceiving 
These refer to a form of electronic warfare.  Some Electronic Attack (EA) 
equipment such as jammers and decoys can be utilized to prevent detection of the system 
by adversary’s radars or to send out bogus signals to confuse or break radar lock from a 
tracking system, thereby preventing an engagement that results in damage. 
Equipment that enables noise jamming and deceiving concepts includes 
the AN/ALQ-131 Self Protection Jammer Pod (used by F-16, F-111, A-10 aircraft, etc.), 
the ALE-50 Active Towed Decoy, and the SPJ-40 ECM Jammer (an internally mounted 
jammer by ELISRA). 
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h. Tactics and Crew Training and Proficiency 
Tactics are about how units are employed.  Tactics that minimize exposure 
of a system to threat, while still achieving the mission objectives, reduce the system 
susceptibility.  For example, the UA can fly higher than 15,000 feet to avoid hits by an 
adversary’s anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). 
Crew training & proficiency will determine how well a mission is 
executed, how the system will react when a threat is discovered, etc.  It can be expected 
that a UAS operated by a proficient crew will survive longer in combat than one that is 
less competent; therefore it is important that a crew has proper training which increases 
their proficiency. 
i. Expendables 
Robert E. Ball defines expendables as materials or devices designed to be 
ejected from a system for the purpose of denying or deceiving threat tracking systems for 
a limited period of time [13].  These expendables can be used to draw the threat 
propagator away from the UA, thus preventing the damage mechanism from reaching the 
UA.  Examples of expendables include chaff, Active Towed Decoy Systems, flares, and 
aerosols (e.g., smokes and fogs). 
2. Reducing Vulnerability 
Reducing vulnerability is about reducing the likelihood a system is killed after it 
is hit by a damage mechanism in a hostile environment.  Vulnerability involves 
improving fault tolerance, hardening, and/or damage suppression of critical components, 
so as to control or minimize the amount of consequence of the damage to the system 
caused by the damage mechanism.  In short, the aim of vulnerability reduction is to 
reduce the likelihood of critical system components being killed after the system is hit.  
The vulnerability reduction concepts were listed in Table 1 and are discussed in detail in 
the following subsections.  
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a. Damage Suppression 
Damage suppression can be broadly classified into passive and active.  
Passive damage suppression incorporates in the system design features that can contain or 
reduce the effectiveness of damage mechanisms.  Being passive, these features have no 
damage-sensing capabilities [13].  Passive damage suppression includes damage 
tolerance, ballistic resistance, delayed failure, leakage suppression, fire and explosion 
suppression, and fail-safe response.  An example of passive damage suppression is a self-
sealing tank where the tank is surrounded by one or more layers of sealant (such as 
uncured rubber).  When the tank is punctured, exposure of the sealant to the fuel will 
result in a swelling of the sealant and closure of the wound. 
Active damage suppression incorporates features that, upon sensing that 
damage has occurred, will activate functions that can contain or reduce the effectiveness 
of damage mechanisms.  An example of active damage suppression is a fire detection and 
extinguish system.  Upon the detection of fire, the system will automatically dispense 
fire-inerting gas or liquid to put out the fire. 
b. Component Redundancy (With Separation) 
Redundancy is the employment of more than necessary components in the 
system.  Similar or same sets of components performing identical functions are said to 
have actual redundancy.  An example is the Boeing B-777 aircraft having two engines 
when only one is required to fly.  On the other hand, the use of different sets of 
components to perform the same function is said to have functional redundancy.  An 
example is the Global Hawk equipped with both Electro-Optics (EO) and Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) for imaging functions. 
In order to effectively reduce vulnerability, these redundant components 
are to be separated physically too.  This is to minimize damage to all components when 
an area is hit.  Component redundancy without separation only increases system 
reliability, but not survivability. 
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c. Component Location 
Locating components in a manner so as to reduce the probability of a 
damage mechanism from killing the system is another vulnerability reduction concept.  
This includes placing critical components away from weak spots, placing a non-critical 
component in front of (i.e., shielding) a critical component, and orienting critical 
components in such a way that minimal area is presented to threat.  The A-10 Close Air 
Support aircraft applies this concept by locating both its engines high on its fuselage so 
that the area presented to AAA is minimal. 
d. Component Shielding 
Component shielding is achieved by covering/surrounding the critical 
component with another material that is able to reduce or absorb the impact of the 
damage mechanism.  The use of armor to protect the crew in a tank is an example of 
component shielding. 
e. Component Elimination or Replacement 
Component redundancy mentioned earlier improves survivability but at 
the expense of increasing requirements for maintenance.  This is because there are now 
more components to maintain.  Another way to reduce vulnerability is to eliminate the 
component or to replace it with a less vulnerable component that performs the same 
function.  This arguably may be a better approach than component redundancy.  An 
example is replacing mechanical control rods and linkages with multiple and separated 
wires in fly-by-wire aircraft.  The wires present smaller areas as compared to the rods and 
linkages, therefore reducing the likelihood of being damaged by a hit. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Combat survivability is defined as the capability of a system, including its crew, 
to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment.  To enhance combat survivability, 
susceptibility and/or vulnerability of UAS has to be reduced.  Numerous susceptibility 
and vulnerability reduction concepts have been identified.  Using these concepts, multiple 
survivability enhancement options can be designed to counter threats. 
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III. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM 
A. OVERVIEW OF AN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM 
A UAV (or UA) is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense 
(DoD) Dictionary as: 
a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be 
piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal 
or non-lethal payload.  Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, 
and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. 
A basic UAS consists of one or more unmanned aircrafts, ground control station 
(may include mission planning capability), payload(s), and data link.  However, many 
systems also include launch and recovery systems, unmanned aircraft carriers, and 
ground handling and maintenance equipment [14].  Figure 8 shows a generic UAS. 
 
Figure 8.   A Generic UAS [From 14]. 
 
1. Unmanned Aircraft 
The unmanned aircraft (UA) is the airborne component of UAS.  It is the 
executioner’s arm of UAS.  The UA includes an airframe, propulsion system, 
 24
communication/identification system, navigation system, fuel system, electrical system, 
computer, and automatic flight control system.  Refer to Figure 9 for an illustrated look 
inside a UA example.  The UA is very much like an aircraft without the cockpit and 
follows the same laws of aerodynamics.  Payloads are not considered as part of the UA as 
payloads are interchangeable with different UAs. 
 
Figure 9.   A Look Inside the RQ-1 Predator [From 15]. 
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Some of the more commonly known examples of UAs include the RQ-1 Predator, 
RQ-2B Pioneer, RQ-4 Global Hawk, RQ-5A Hunter, Skylark, FanTail 5000, Boeing 
ScanEagle, Searcher II, Hermes 450, and Heron. 
2. Ground Control Station 
The ground control station (GCS) is the operational center (the brain) of UAS.  
The GCS is where video images as well as command and telemetry data from the 
unmanned aircraft are processed and displayed.  The size of the GCS can range from as 
large as a shelter to as small as a handheld computer (as shown in Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.   A Handheld Computer Serving as the Ground Control Station for the Skylark 
Mini UAV [From 16]. 
 
To serve its role as the operational center, a GCS typically consists of control and 
display consoles, video and telemetry instrumentation, computation and signal processing 
equipment, and ground data terminal.  Larger GCS (with shelter) also include 
environmental control systems and survivability protection equipment.  Some GCS may 
also include facilities for mission planning. 
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The GCS may also be where the mission commander plans the mission, receives 
mission assignments from supported units, and reports acquired data and information to 
the appropriate units (the customers).  A larger station typically also has positions for 
both the unmanned aircraft and mission payload operators to perform their respective 
functions. 
A cut-away view of a typical sheltered GCS is shown in Figure 11.  As can be 
seen from the depiction, the shelter houses computers, monitors and telemetry equipment 
for controlling the UA, a radio set to communicate with supported units, and a work table 
for mission planning. 
 
Figure 11.   A Typical Ground Control Station [From 14]. 
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3. Launch and Recovery System 
A number of techniques can be used to launch and recover UAs.  Smaller UAs 
can be launched by simply throwing them into the air, or slinging them into the air using 
bungees, thereby eliminating the need for complex launch and recovery systems.  Larger 
UAs, on the other hand, need to be launched using prepared sites (such as runways), 
catapults, or air launched. 
A UA can be recovered by landing on prepared sites, captured by nets or arresting 
gears (for point recoveries in small areas), or simply fall out of sky and break into large 
pieces (and rejoined easily for the next mission). 
For larger UA, there is usually a separate control station dedicated to launch and 
recover the UA.  This separate station communicates with the UA through line-of-sight 
(LOS) instead of through satellite.  The delays in communication through a satellite relay 
may be too long to facilitate the quick reactions required during the critical moments of 
taking off and landing.  There is minimal delay in LOS communications. 
Figure 12 below shows a ScanEagle launching from its catapult launching system. 
 




Payloads are usually the “eyes and ears” of UAS.  The ultimate purpose of a UAS 
is to carry payload.  The payload is also usually the most expensive equipment onboard a 
UA.  For example, the Integrated Sensor Suite (ISS) installed in the RQ-4 Block 10 
Global Hawk represents over 33 percent of the aircraft’s total cost, while the sensor 
package to be installed into the RQ-4 Block 20 is estimated to represent 54 percent of the 
aircraft’s total cost [7]. 
Payloads often include video cameras, either daylight or night (infrared), and 
depending on the mission, may also include radar sensors (Moving Target Indicator and 
Synthetic Aperture Radar, SAR) for reconnaissance missions, full spectrum of signal 
intelligence (SIGINT) and jammer equipment for electronic warfare (EW) missions, 
meteorological and chemical sensing devices for other non-lethal missions.  When the 
USAF decided to weaponize the RQ-1 Predator to carry AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 
munitions such as bombs and missiles became another type of payload for a UA. 
As important as payloads may be, payloads typically account for only 10 to 20 
percent of a UA’s gross weight [7].  This is mainly due to the desire for endurance in 
many UAs, resulting in a high fuel fraction and a corresponding low payload fraction. 
5. Data Links 
The data link is a key subsystem for any UAS that provides the linkage between 
the GCS and its UA from some distance away.  The data link can provide either on-
demand or continuous two-way communication.  An up-link for transmitting commands 
to control the unmanned aircraft or its payload typically has a data rate of a few kHz.  
The down-link, on the other hand, provides both a low data rate channel and a high data 
rate channel (1 to 10 MHz) [14].  The low rate channel is used to acknowledge 
commands and transmit unmanned aircraft and payload status information, while the high 
rate channel is used to transmit images or sensor data from the payload.  This is 
summarized in Figure 13. 
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Other than communication, the data link can also be used to determine unmanned 
aircraft position by measuring its azimuth and range from the GCS antenna.  Knowledge 
of this relative position not only aids navigation of the unmanned aircraft, but can also be 
used to determine target location. 
 
Figure 13.   Elements of a UAS Data Link [From 14]. 
 
The data link typically utilizes microwave technology to provide communications 
between the GCS and the UA.  It consists of a ground-based data terminal and an 
airborne data terminal.  The communication is either through line-of-sight (LOS) or via 
satellite (if over the horizon). 
The ground data terminal is either co-located with the GCS shelter or remotely 
positioned.  In the case of a remote location, the terminal is typically connected to the 
GCS by hard wire such as fiber-optic cables (the EL/K-1861 ground data terminal, as 
shown in Figure 14 can be connected to the GCS, up to 5 kilometers away, using one or 
two optical cables).  As the signal transmission has a tendency to radiate rather openly 
and draw fire, locating the data terminal away from the GCS reduces the likelihood of the 
GCS being hit by enemy fire. 
 30
 
Figure 14.   A Ground Data Terminal – EL/K-1861 [From 17]. 
 
The ground terminal transmits flight control and payload commands, and receives 
flight status information (altitude, speed, direction, etc.) and mission payload sensor data 
(video imagery, target range, lines of bearing, etc.). 
Additional ground terminals may also be co-located with the users of sensor data.  
One example is the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) system [18].  
In such cases, the users likely will have the capability to only receive data but not 
transmit commands to the unmanned aircraft. 
The air data terminal includes a video transmitter and antenna for transmitting 
images and unmanned aircraft data, and a receiver for receiving commands from the 
ground. 
Figure 15 shows the communications architecture of the RQ-4 Global Hawk.  As 
can be seen, the Global Hawk system uses both LOS and satellite communications for the 
GCS (Mission Control Element and DCGS in the figure) to transmit command to the UA, 




Figure 15.   RQ-4 Global Hawk Communications Architecture Showing Various Data Links 
[From 7]. 
 
6. Ground Support Equipment 
Ground support equipment (GSE) includes test and maintenance equipment, 
equipment necessary to move the unmanned aircraft about (to place it on a launcher, for 
instance), a starter motor, auxiliary power units, etc.  Often neglected, the GSE is actually 
an important part of an increasingly complex UAS.  Without GSE, the availability of 
UAS is severely affected. 
7. Physical Decomposition of UAS 
UAS is a very complex system that is made up many subsystems and components.  
A physical decomposition of a UAS will show the complexity.  Many of these 
components emit signatures that can be exploited by the adversary to detect, identify, and 
track UAS.  Some threat propagators (such as SAMs) launched by the adversary hone-in 
on these signatures.  Any degradation in these components can also degrade the mission 
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being performed and may even lead to the destruction of parts of UAS, or even the entire 
UAS.  As an example, a UA will be destroyed if its wing is destroyed while in flight.   
A physical decomposition of a UAS (with a fixed wing UA) is presented in Figure 
16. 
  Unmanned Aircraft System 
1.0   Unmanned Aircraft (Fixed Wing) 
1.1.0      Airframe 
1.1.1       Wing, empennage, fuselage, and associated flight control system 
1.1.2       Air induction system, exhausts, starters, inlet control system 
1.1.3       Alighting gear; tires, tubes, wheels, brakes, hydraulics, etc. 
1.1.4       Secondary power (not applicable for most UA) 
1.1.5       Environmental control, racks, mounts, intersystem cables and 
distribution boxes, etc., which are inherent to and non-separable from 
the assembled structure 
1.1.6       Dynamic systems-transmissions, gear boxes, propellers, if not furnished 
as an integral part of the propulsion unit 
1.1.7       Other equipment homogeneous to the airframe 
1.2.0     Propulsion 
1.2.1       The engine as a propulsion unit within itself (e.g., reciprocating, turbo, 
or other type propulsion) suitable for integration with the airframe 
1.2.2       Transmission, gear boxes and engine control units, if furnished as 
integral to the propulsion unit 
1.2.3       Engine control electronics (hardware and software integral to the 
propulsion system) 
1.3.0     Communications/Identification System 
1.3.1       Radio system(s), identification equipment (IFF), Airborne Data 
Terminal, and control boxes associated with the specific equipment 
1.4.0     Navigation System 
1.4.1       Radar, radio, GPS, INS or other essential navigation equipment, radar 
altimeter, direction finding set, Doppler compass, computer, and other 
equipment homogeneous to the navigation/guidance function 
1.5.0     Fuel System 
1.5.1       Fuel Management System 
1.5.2       Fuel cells 
1.5.3       Fuel transfer systems, valves, etc. 
1.6.0     Electrical System 
1.6.1       Generator 
1.6.2       Batteries 
1.7.0     Central Computer 
1.8.0     Automatic Flight Control System (UA capable of performing autonomous 
flight) 
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1.8.1       Flight control computers, signal processors, and data transmitting 
elements that are devoted to processing data for either primary or 
automatic flight control functions 
1.8.2       Electronic devices required for signal processing, data formatting, and 
interfacing between the flight control elements; the data buses, optical 
links, and other elements devoted to transmitting flight control data 
1.8.3       Flight control sensors such as pressure transducers, rate gyros, 
accelerometers, and motion sensors 
1.9.0     Auxiliary Equipment 
1.9.1       Auxiliary airframe equipment such as external fuel tanks, pods, etc. 
1.9.2       Multi-use equipment like antennas, control boxes, power supplies, 
environmental control, racks, and mountings, not homogeneous to the 
prescribed WBS elements 
1.9.3       De-ice system 
1.10.0     Built-in Test System (for fault detection and reporting) 
1.11.0     Survivability Features (if already equipped) 
1.11.1       Warning devices and other electronic devices, electronic 
countermeasures, jamming transmitters, chaff, infra-red jammers 
2.0   Ground Control System (Sheltered) 
2.1.0     UA Data Display and Controls 
2.1.1       Aircraft status displays, display control units, display processors 
2.1.2       Display/control interfaces; switches, pedals, control grips such as those 
for the stick/yoke, throttle, cyclic and collective 
2.1.3       Aircraft data feed displays; TV monitors, etc. 
2.2.0     Mission Planning Equipment 
2.2.1       System computers, printer, stationery, etc. 
2.2.2       Situation displays, charts, maps, etc. 
2.3.0     Communication System 
2.3.1       Radio system(s), Ground Data Terminal, and control boxes associated 
with the specific equipment 
2.3.2       Network, computer processing and display hardware such as routers, 
switches, servers, workstations, storage devices, etc. 
2.4.0     Shelter 
2.4.1       Cooling systems, chemical/biological protection 
2.4.2       Interior/exterior lighting, seat installations, consoles, instrument panels 
2.4.3       Tables, chairs 
2.5.0     Auxiliary Equipment 
2.5.1       Multi-use equipment like antennas, control boxes, power supplies, 
environmental control, racks, and mountings, not homogeneous to the 
prescribed WBS elements 
3.0   Payload 
3.1.0     IMINT Sensors 
3.1.1       Electro-Optic Sensor (TV, FLIR), SAR, LIDAR, etc. 
3.2.0     COMMINT systems 
3.3.0     Communication sets for re-broadcast 
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3.4.0     CRBN Sensor 
3.5.0     Electronic Warfare System 
3.5.1       Electronic countermeasures, jammers, electromagnetic deception 
equipment, or weapons that use electromagnetic or directed energy such 
as laser, RF weapons, or particle beams 
3.6.0     Weapons Delivery 
3.6.1       Targeting system 
3.6.2       Fire Control Computer and control and safety devices 
3.6.3       Launchers, pods, bomb racks, pylons, integral release mechanisms, and 
other mechanical or electro-mechanical equipments specifically oriented 
to the weapons delivery function 
3.6.4       Armament/Ordnance 
3.7.0     Recorder 
4.0   Other Ground Elements 
4.1.0     Launch & Recovery Systems 
4.1.1       Catapult launching system 
4.1.2       Arresting nets/lines 
4.1.3       Runways 
4.1.4       Parachute systems 
4.1.5       Bungee cords 
4.2.0     Ground Support Equipment 
4.2.1       Test & maintenance equipment 
4.2.2       Starter motor, auxiliary power unit (APU) 
4.2.3       Transport equipment 
4.2.4       Fuel tanker 
Figure 16.   Physical Decomposition of UAS [After 19]. 
 
B. MISSION 
UAS are said to be better suited to perform “dull, dirty and dangerous” missions 
than manned systems. 
Dull missions are typically long missions that have little “action” through the 
duration of the mission.  The longest USAF B-2 bomber sortie during Operation 
Enduring Freedom lasted just over 44 hours.  Fatigue management of the two-person 
crew was a serious concern to the unit commanders for long duration sorties [20].  




mission.  For example, Predator missions (typically lasting 16 hours or more) require two 
sets of pilots and sensor operators who are rotated every four hours or less to reduce 
fatigue [21]. 
Dirty missions such as collecting radioactive samples are best performed by 
unmanned systems.  In 1948, when the USAF decided that the risk associated with 
humans flying through nuclear clouds within minutes after bomb detonation to collect 
radioactive samples was “manageable,” pilots wearing 60-lb lead suits were sent to 
perform the missions.  Some of these pilots subsequently died due to being trapped by 
their lead suits after crashing or due to long-term radiation effects.  If UAs are sent to 
perform these missions instead, the probability of mission success may increase and 
human exposure will definitely decrease. 
Reconnaissance missions have historically been dangerous.  Twenty five percent 
of the 3rd Reconnaissance Group’s pilots were lost in North Africa during World War II, 
compared to five percent of bomber crews flying over Germany [7].  The risk associated 
with flying reconnaissance missions over the USSR became politically and militarily 
unacceptable when Francis Gary Powers was shot down in his U-2 and captured on May 
1, 1960.  Manned reconnaissance flights over the USSR stopped the next day [7].  On the 
other hand, when seven UAs (AQM-34 Firebees) were lost over China between 1965 and 
1971, it was hardly noticed by the U.S. public [7].  The employment of UAs not only 
reduces the risk of human loss in high threat environments, it also reduces political 
impact. 
1. Mission Priorities for UAS 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in 2006, requested input from 
combatant commanders (COCOM) and military departments to prioritize the DoD’s 
unmanned mission needs.  Each COCOM and military department was asked to rank 
mission areas across various types and classes of UAS.  The priority lists as shown in 
Table 3 represent a best fit of the data received. 
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The aircraft classes used in Table 3 are defined by OSD [20] as:  
• Small - Gross takeoff weight (GTOW) less than 55 lbs. 
• Tactical - GTOW between 55 and 1320 lbs. 
• Theater - GTOW greater than 1320 lbs. 
• Combat - An aircraft designed from inception as a strike platform with 
internal bomb bays or external weapons pylons, a high level of survivability, 
and a GTOW greater than 1320 lbs.  An example is the Navy Unmanned 
Combat Air System. 
 
Table 3.   COCOM and Military Department UAS Needs Prioritized By Aircraft Class 
[After 20]. 
Mission Area Small Tactical Theater Combat 
Reconnaissance 1 1 1 1 
Precision Target Location and Designation 2 2 2 2 
Signals Intelligence 7 3 3 4 
Battle Management 3 4 5 6 
Communications/Data Relay 8 6 4 7 
CBRNE Reconnaissance 5 5 9 8 
Combat Search and Rescue 4 7 8 9 
Weaponization/Strike 16 8 7 3 
Electronic Warfare 12 11 6 5 
Mine Detection/Countermeasures 6 9 12 11 
 
It can be seen in Table 3 that the top two missions across all aircraft types are 
reconnaissance and precision target location and designation.  These missions require 
UAS to fly deep into the adversary’s territory (in exceptional cases where the payload has 
excellent target detection probability and relative long range lasing, UAS need not fly 
into the adversary’s territory).  UAS is exposed to lots of danger and requires good 
combat survivability to ensure that it can perform the missions. 
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2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is defined in Joint 
Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary as: 
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of 
sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in 
direct support of current and future operations.  This is an integrated 
intelligence and operations function. 
When separated, each term is defined in the same publication as: 
Intelligence – The product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available 
information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile 
forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.  The term is 
also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the 
organizations engaged in such activity. 
Surveillance – The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or 
subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, 
photographic, or other means. 
Reconnaissance – A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation 
or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources 
of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, 
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. 
 
The terms “surveillance” and “reconnaissance” are also defined in the Canadian 
Military Journal, Vol 2, No. 4, Winter 2001-2002 [22] as 
Surveillance – Systematic observation by technical sensors or human 
beings. 
Reconnaissance – Directed mission(s) to obtain specific information. 
As can be seen, reconnaissance is a subset of surveillance, which in turn is a 
subset of intelligence.  As the equipment required for a UA to perform intelligence 
gathering, surveillance or reconnaissance is very similar, ISR missions are discussed 
together in this thesis. 
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ISR (especially reconnaissance) is probably the most common type of mission for 
a UAS.  UAs have an established and growing record of supporting ISR missions.  The 
importance of ISR was recognized when USAF Col. Eric Mathewson, director of the Air 
Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force, commented on October 17, 2008, that 
“ISR and intelligence missions are no longer support operations, they are the operations 
[23].”  The endurance attribute makes UAs extremely suitable for ISR missions, 
especially if the mission requires persistent coverage.  The “humanless” attribute of UAs 
also makes it an excellent candidate for reconnaissance missions deep inside the 
adversary’s territory as there is no danger of having a soldier captured while performing 
the mission.  ISR missions typically imply detection, recognition, identification, and 
classification of targets (stationary and moving) during day and night. 
a. Payload 
Payloads for ISR are either passive or active sensors.  Passive sensors do 
not intentionally or actively radiate any energy but rely on radiated energy from their 
targets.  Passive sensors include TV cameras, infrared cameras (such as FLIR) for 
imagery intelligence (IMINT) missions, and radio receivers as well as radio direction-
finding equipment for SIGINT missions. 
Active sensors, on the other hand, transmit energy and detect energy 
reflected directly or indirectly from the targets.  The transmitted energy must be 
sufficiently distinguishable so that there is ample energy reflected from the target and 
detected by the sensor.  An example of an active sensor is radar (SAR for IMINT). 
The sensor payloads play an important role in the combat survivability of 
the UA.  Payload performance may determine the UA’s exposure to threat.  A sensor 
with a long detection range may allow the UA to have a longer stand-off range to the 
threat.  A sensor with better resolution may mean the probability of detecting the target is 
high, thus reducing the number of revisits required.  Active sensors are also energy 
sources that can be exploited by the adversary to detect the UA.  Changing the energy 
level may reduce the likelihood of the adversary detecting the energy signatures of the 
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UA, but may also affect the performance of the sensor.  A balance between the 
survivability requirement and performance requirement needs to be achieved. 
3. Precision Target Location and Designation 
Precision target location and designation is a two part function.  The first part of 
the function, target location, derives target coordinates.  This requires both precise 
measurement of the target position relative to the UA and accurate reading of the UA’s 
position.  Measurement of the target position relative to the UA can be achieved with 
laser measuring equipment, measurement of the angular position of the optic sensor, 
spectral interferometry or other geometric determining methods.  Reading of the UA 
position, meanwhile, depends on the Global Positioning System (GPS), Inertia 
Navigation System (INS), or radio measurement using data link. 
The second part of the function, target designation, is the indication of a target 
[20].  Precision target location and designation missions can be performed with the same 
payload used for IMINT except when precision-guided munitions (PGM) are to be used.  
To guide PGM, a laser designator feature needs to be added to the UA so as to illuminate 
the target for destruction either by the same platform or by another platform. 
The act of lasing the target affects the combat survivability of the UA.  When the 
UA lases the target, the adversary with the right equipment can detect and locate the UA, 
thereby increasing the probability of the adversary killing the UA.  Proper tactics must be 
employed to ensure that the lasing period is shorter than the detection frequency (or its 
logical electronic processing equivalent) so as to minimize the UA exposure to threat. 
C. FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO PERFORM MISSION 
Performing a UAS mission is a complex operation involving at least nine major 
functions.  The flight profile needs to be planned before the mission begins.  The UA then 
needs to be launched and flown safely to the correct target area.  When over the target 
area, the payload needs to be operational, and the communication between the GCS and 
UA needs to be maintained to ensure constant live feed of the target area.  Upon 
completion of the mission, the UA needs to be recovered, and finally, turned around for 
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the next mission.  Disruption to any of the functions may lead to degradation of the 
mission performance.  For example, if the communication between the GCS and UA is 
disrupted, the UA will not be able to provide real-time video to its customers, thus failing 
its mission.  In some cases, the entire UAS (or parts of it) may even be destroyed. 
The quality of many of these functions also has an impact on the survivability of 
UAS.  For example, if the flight profile is poorly planned and the UA is to fly over a 
heavily defended area, it is more likely that the UA will be shot down by air defense 
components. 
The performance of some functions may even attract the attention of the 
adversary to UAS.  For example, an adversary with radio direction-finding capability 
may be able to locate the positions of the GCS and/or UA by detecting and analyzing the 
data link between the two subsystems.  UAS is especially susceptible to such detection if 
constant communication between the GCS and UA is to be maintained. 
As an example to demonstrate the complexity of performing a UAS mission, a 
functional analysis of the functions required to perform a reconnaissance operation by 
UAS is performed (see Figure 17).  Even though the functions identified are based on one 
UA performing the reconnaissance mission, many of the functions are also applicable 
when a UAS is performing other mission types.  The figure illustrates the complexity of 
operating an UAS.  Many of these functions need to be protected or performed well to 
ensure the survivability of UAS. 
 
 To Perform Unmanned Aircraft System Reconnaissance Operations 
1.0   Plan Flight Profile/Route 
1.1.0     Understand mission 
1.2.0     Identify locations of threats 
1.3.0     Know about area of operations 
1.3.1       Find out about terrain in area of operations 
1.3.2       Find out about threat in area of operations 
1.3.3       Find out about weather in area of operations 
1.3.4       Find out about other friendly assets in area of operations 
1.4.0     Identify target areas 
 41
1.5.0     De-conflict with other air assets 
1.6.0     Decide on number of UAs required for mission 
1.7.0     Decide on number of crew and rotation needed 
2.0   Prepare the UA 
2.1.0     Perform preflight tasks 
2.1.1       Plan for mission 
2.1.2       Pilot and sensor operator briefed on mission and plan 
2.1.3       Perform preflight inspections/checks 
2.1.4       Fuel UA for mission 
2.1.5       Prepare payload for mission 
2.2.0     Launch UA 
2.2.1       Start engine 
2.2.2       Position UA on launch point (start of runway or on catapult, etc.) 
2.2.3       Accelerate to take off speed 
2.2.4       External pilot hands UA control over to mission pilot (aka internal 
pilot) 
3.0   Fly the UA 
3.1.0     Fly 
3.1.1       Generate thrust 
3.1.2       Generate lift 
3.1.3       Pitch, roll and yaw 
3.2.0     Navigate 
3.2.1       Measure current position of UA 
3.2.1.1         Measure altitude 
3.2.1.2         Measure coordinates 
3.2.2       Know position of waypoints / targets (coordinates and altitudes) 
3.3.0     Control flight (autonomously or manually) 
3.3.1       Know current state of UA (altitude, angle of attack, roll angle, etc)
3.3.1.1         Measure angle of attack 
3.3.1.2         Measure altitude 
3.3.1.3         Measure roll angle 
3.3.1.4         Measure pitch angle 
3.3.1.5         Measure heading 
3.3.2       Fly UA to desired altitude, speed, and direction 
3.3.2.1         Adjust thrust and/or move elevator to change altitude 
3.3.2.2         Adjust thrust and/or move ailerons and/or rudder to roll 
3.3.2.3         Adjust thrust and/or move and/or rudder to yaw 
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3.4.0     Communicate between operator and UA 
3.4.1       To encrypt uplink 
3.4.2       To transmit messages / data 
3.4.3       To point transmitting antenna towards receiving antenna and vice 
versa 
3.5.0     To maintain situational awareness of operator 
3.5.1       Interpret status of UA from various display 
3.5.2       Interpret what UA sensor is picking up 
3.5.3       Understand information (coming from other sources) on area of 
operations 
3.5.4       Form cognitive picture of situation 
4.0   UA Performs Mission 
4.1.0     Operate payload 
4.1.1       Know the environment (including weather) that UA is currently in 
4.1.2       Understand characteristics of payload and how the current 
environment affects performance 
4.1.3       Control payload remotely from GCS 
4.2.0     Install the right payload on UA 
4.2.1       Know the mission 
4.2.1.1         Know target to look for so that UA can bring the right payload 
4.2.2       Know weather condition of the target area so that UA can bring 
the right payload 
4.3.0     To arrive at area of operations 
4.3.1       Survive long enough in the hostile environment to arrive at area of 
operations and perform mission 
4.4.0     Maintain coverage over target area for required time 
4.5.0     Send images/videos to operator 
4.5.1       Maintain down link between UA and GCS 
4.6.0     To interpret image/video 
4.6.1       Obtain images of sufficient quality for interpretation 
4.7.0   Maintain UA in state that is optimal/necessary for payload operation 
5.0   UAS to Survive Hostile Environment 
5.1.0     Avoid being hit by damage mechanism from adversary 
5.1.1       Avoid detection by adversary 
5.1.2       Prevent adversary from obtaining a firing solution on UAS 
5.1.3       Prevent the threat damage mechanism from hitting UAS 
5.2.0     Avoid being killed by damage 
5.2.1       Resist damage (especially to critical components) 
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5.2.2       Tolerate damage (especially to critical components) 
6.0   Post-Mission 
6.1.0     Recover UA 
6.1.1       Launch pilot (aka external pilot) takes UA control over from 
mission pilot (aka internal pilot) 
6.1.2       Prepare UA for landing 
6.1.2.1         Decelerate UA 
6.1.2.2         Position UA to landing point 
6.1.3       Land UA or trap UA 
6.1.4       Stop UA engine 
6.1.5       Stop UA from moving 
6.2.0     Perform post-flight tasks 
6.2.1       Perform post-flight inspection / checks 
6.2.2       Prepare UA for next mission 
7.0   Maintain UAS 
7.1.0     Perform preventive maintenance 
7.2.0     Perform corrective maintenance 
7.3.0     Perform inspections (pre-flight, post-flight, etc.) 
8.0   Support UAS 
8.1.0     Provide spares 
8.2.0     Train operators, intelligence officers (to interpret what UA sees), and 
technicians 
8.3.0     Provide integrated logistics support 
8.4.0     Transport UA, GCS, and other support equipment to launch site or 
from recovery site 
8.5.0     Store UA, GCS and other related equipment 
9.0   Communicate to Supported Unit 
9.1.0     Provide intelligence that the supported unit requires 
9.2.0     Supported unit tells UA operator area of operations 




D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an introduction to UAS.  As can be seen, UAS can be 
broken down into six major subsystems.  Each of these subsystems is a candidate for 
survivability enhancement so as to achieve the overall survivability improvement. 
A functional analysis of the steps involved in a reconnaissance mission illustrates 
the complexity of a UAS operation.  Many of these functions can attract the adversary’s 





IV. THREAT TO UAS 
Threats to UAS have evolved since the 1960s.  Fighter aircraft were the primary 
threat to American UAs during the Vietnam War.  Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMs) then 
became the primary threats during conflicts in Syria and Angola in the 1980s [7].  
Encounters in recent conflicts show that small arms and anti-aircraft artilleries have now 
become the new primary threats.  Threats to UAS will continue to evolve due to tactical, 
strategic, technological, and political factors [7].  It is important to appreciate the 
dimensions and characteristics of the threat environment the system will likely encounter 
so as to better design for survivability of the system. 
A. INTELLIGENCE 
Accurate intelligence information about UAS employment and operations will 
allow the adversary to narrow the spectrum of UAS characteristics to attack in a specific 
region or conflict.  The adversary can tailor its anti-UAS defense to UAS to maximize its 
effectiveness.  For example, if it is known that the UA communicates with the GCS 
within a fixed bandwidth, the adversary can rely solely on disruption or taking control of 
the communication link within that bandwidth.  As the counteraction is more in focus, 
there is a higher chance for the adversary to succeed. 
With observations and intelligence on UAS operations, the adversary may be able 
to recognize patterns or limitations of UAS.  Such intelligence can be exploited to affect 
the mission effectiveness of UAS.  During Operation Allied Forces, most NATO UAs 
were based in Macedonia and only launched from a handful of sites.  The Serbs were able 
to gather such information on UAS deployment and positioned their air defense elements 
near likely UA flight paths.  During the same war, German UAS units had operated in a 
very predictable pattern.  They launched their UA at the same time everyday for several 
weeks.  The Serbs recognized this pattern and had their air defense forces ready as targets 
appear at specific times [24]. 
 
 46
An adversary may also target UA launch and support facilities before the UA can 
be used to perform its mission [25].  If these facilities are destroyed, the UA can not be 
launched or recovered, or turned around in time for the next mission.  UA availability 
will be adversely reduced.  It is therefore necessary to prevent the adversary from 
locating the ground elements.  As with other military systems, it is important to prevent 
the adversary from gathering useful intelligence on operations, locations, and capabilities 
of UAS. 
B. SEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES 
The adversary has various means (e.g., radar, electro-optical sensors, thermal 
imagers) that can be used to search for UAS.  These means can be either active or 
passive. 
1. Radar 
Radar can have relatively large search volumes and long ranges, making it 
desirable for the adversary to use for searching air space for the UA.  Today, many types 
of radar can operate between 138 MHz and 36 GHz, though most of the radars against 
aircraft transmit between 2 and 18 GHz [26].  Most radars are capable of measuring 
range, radial velocity, and angular position (azimuth and elevation) of their targets.  Low 
frequency radar may give effectively higher radar cross-section (RCS) so even smaller 
UAs with lower RCS can be detected.  It is possible to detect UAs reliably with radar 
cross-sections as small as 0.001 m2 at ranges as far as 65 km [27]. 
Some radar is even capable of providing three-dimensional accuracy in severe 
clutter and electronic countermeasure (ECM) environments.  These radars achieve high 
definition by minimizing clutter effects for low-level detection, hostile ECM 
effectiveness, and susceptibility to anti-radiation attack.  Radar can be virtually “all-
weather” (except in heavy rainfall or snow where RF signals are significantly attenuated) 
and have day/night capabilities, and thus can be used for surveillance of the sky 24 hours 
a day, 7 days a week.  
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2. Electro-Optical Sensors 
Electro-Optical (EO) sensors detect signatures in the visible electromagnetic 
radiation range (wavelengths between 400 nm and 700 nm).  Detection of the UA using 
EO sensors is dependent on environmental factors and contrast between the UA and its 
local environment.  Fogs, clouds, heavy haze, and heavy rain significantly degrade the 
performance of these EO sensors.  It is possible to detect a UA at ranges up to 10 km 
using EO sensors [27].  Examples of EO sensors include TV cameras (for daytime) and 
image intensifiers (for night vision). 
Most EO sensors are passive systems that emit no tell-tale sign of their usage in 
tracking the UA.  The UA is therefore often caught by surprise when EO sensors are used 
in conjunction with lethal threats to the UA. 
3. Thermal Imager 
Thermal imagers use thermal radiation emitted by the objects themselves to form 
images of the objects.  Thermal imagers typically operate in two major atmospheric 
windows (3.0 – 5.5 μ m and 8.0 – 14.0 μ m).  The imaging systems are capable of 
providing information on a target's angular positions (azimuth and elevation).  Thermal 
detection of UAs is dependent on environmental factors as thermal imagers can have 
good performance in most weather (except in foggy, cloudy, or rainy environments).  Hot 
targets that produce temperature differences of at least 10 K with respect to their 
environment can be detected at ranges of 10 – 20 km [26].  Thermal imagers can have 
excellent angular resolution, to as low as 25 μ rad.   
As thermal imagers are passive systems, they can be used to track a UAS without 
the operator potentially knowing.  The first sign of trouble for the target will be when a 
weapon is launched at it.  Also, as target recognition is only possible at relatively short 
ranges, the standoff range between the UA and the threat is likely to be short. 
4. Passive Radio Frequency Intercept 
The active emissions of a UA can be exploited by the adversary for detection.  
Adversary using direction-finding equipment can locate an UA within a resolution of less 
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than 15 degrees in one second and five degrees in 10-20 seconds.  Some equipment is 
capable of detecting low band emitters, such as data links, from 14 kilometers or greater.  
It can expected that active jammers and radars with stronger powers may be detectable at 
even greater ranges [28]. 
As can be seen, radio frequency intercept can detect an active UA at long ranges 
in a very short period.  With persistent surveillance, radio frequency intercept can even 
detect short bursts of intermittent data link transmissions.  Information gathered through 
radio frequency intercepts often allows the adversary to identify the emitter. 
As radio frequency intercept is passive, the UA may not be aware that it has been 
detected by the adversary.  The adversary can then cue other sensor systems to better 
identify the UA. 
C. THREAT WITH HARD-KILL CAPABILITY 
Some threat elements have hard-kill capabilities that can damage or even kill 
UAS.  In some cases, these elements can cause the death of personnel supporting UAS 
operations.  These elements include anti-aircraft artilleries (AAA), SAMs, other aircraft 
(such as fighter aircraft or helicopters), and ground forces. 
1. Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AAA is the oldest form of an air defense system.  The AAAs are guns that range 
from 23 mm to 130 mm caliber and have high rates of fire (e.g., a Russian ZU-23 can fire 
a maximum of 2000 rounds per minute).  AAA may be mobile (limited to smaller caliber 
AAA) or fixed.  They can have optical fire control or radar fire control.  AAAs are 
typically effective up to 10,000 ft, with radar-guided AAA achieving higher effective 
altitudes than optic-guided ones. 
2. Surface-Air Missile 
SAMs are designed to destroy aircraft.  SAMs can be IR-guided, radar-guided, 
laser-guided, or optical-guided.  SAMs are broadly classified into two categories, namely 
man portable (also know as MANPADS) and others.  MANPADS are typically smaller 
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than other SAMs and are mostly IR-guided.  Most MANPADS are effective up to 15,000 
feet.  As they are man portable, MANPADS are highly mobile, and therefore the threats 
can be scattered over a large area.  As they are typically IR-guided, the detection of 
MANPADS before launch is almost impossible. 
Larger SAMs typically have larger warheads and longer effective ranges.  The 
optically-guided SA-6 has an effective altitude of 46,000 feet while the radar-guided 
MIM-104 Patriot can reach as high as 80,000 feet.  Virtually all larger UAs are within 
reach of these larger SAMs.  As most of the larger SAMs work with air-search radars, it 
is possible to avoid these SAMs before the missiles are launched. 
3. Other Aircraft 
Other aircraft have been used to destroy UAs.  Records include Soviet MIGs 
shooting down Ryan Firebee during the Vietnam War, an Iraqi MIG-25 destroying a MQ-
1 Predator in 2002, and a presumably Russian MiG-29 shooting down a Georgian 
Hermes 450 in 2008.  In 1999, there were even accounts of Serbs launching Mi-8 HIP 
helicopters to fly alongside UAs belonging to the Allied forces and helicopter door 
gunners blasting the UA with 7.62 mm machine guns [24].  Since most UAs are unable to 
defend themselves against their attackers, nor shoot at the attackers, the attacking aircraft 
almost certainly has a 100 percent kill rate. 
Other than attacking UAs, adversaries may also use their aircraft against the 
ground elements of UAS.  Airstrikes can be called onto GCS and GSE when their 
locations are determined. 
4. Ground Forces 
Ground troops may make “lucky” shots that are capable of destroying a UA flying 
overhead.  This threat is especially true for small, slow, and low-flying UAs.  On 
September 23, 2008, Georgians claim that their police officers shot down a Russian UA 
that was flying at about 160 feet altitude.  The police officers achieved this feat with only 
their automatic weapons [29]. 
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Ground troops probably pose more of a threat against the ground elements such as 
GCS and GSE.  Once the location of the ground elements (especially GCS) is 
determined, artillery can be called upon them or ground troops may even be sent to take 
control over the elements.  Since there is typically more UAs than GCS in a UAS (some 
GCS may control up to four UAs), the loss of one GCS will have more impact on overall 
mission or campaign success than losing one UA. 
D. THREAT WITH SOFT-KILL CAPABILITY 
There exists some threats that have soft-kill capabilities instead of hard-kill 
capabilities.  Damages caused by these threats can be temporary or permanent.  At times, 
it may be sufficient for the threat to cause just temporary disruption to UAS performing 
its mission.  For example, the adversary can temporary blind the UA’s SAR payload (by 
jamming) just when the adversary is moving its forces. 
1. Jamming 
An adversary can use jamming techniques to reduce the effectiveness of the UA’s 
radar payload or the communication data link of UAS.  Noise jammers transmit strong 
noise signals to “drown” out the echoes returning to the radars or the communication 
signals of the data links.  Under such conditions, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) may 
not be able to provide a usable image of the target.  The GCS may not be able to receive 
real-time video feeds from the UA.  The UA may not receive critical commands from the 
GCS, thus missing a turn or not being able to execute a change in the mission. 
2. Software Virus 
Many of the functions of a UAS, such as mission planning, controlling of the UA 
and payload, and receiving information from sensors, are software driven.  An attack by 
malicious software such as a virus or Trojan horse may severely affect mission success.  
The malicious software can be introduced into the system through an unprotected data 
link or during software upgrades, modifications, or initial coding by rouge contractors. 
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3. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
EMPs can be produced using either nuclear weapons or non-nuclear weapons 
such as a large low-inductance capacitor with a single-loop antenna and a microwave 
generator.  The resultant electromagnetic energy may induce currents or voltage surges in 
the electrical circuits.  Depending on the amount of the radiation and coupling 
effectiveness, damages may be temporary or permanent (such as circuit burn).  As most 
of the functions of UAS depend heavily on electronic components, UAS is therefore 
susceptible to an EMP attack. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Potential threats to a UAS are wide-ranging.  The adversary can collect 
intelligence about UAS, detect UAS using a wide range of active and passive sensors, 
and select either hard-kill or soft-kill options to destroy UAS (entire UAS or parts of it) 
or disrupt its operations. 
Sensors exploit the weaknesses of a UAS to detect UAS while the kill options 
attack the weaknesses to destroy or disrupt UAS.  More of these weaknesses will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  Survivability enhancement options that either ameliorate 
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V.  UAS WEAKNESSES 
The adversary can exploit UAS weaknesses to detect, identify, and track UAS or 
attack the weaknesses to destroy it.  Therefore, it is important that these weaknesses are 
identified and either reduced or eliminated to enhance the combat survivability of UAS.  
This chapter combines the results from the physical decomposition and functional 
analysis performed in Chapter III to identify UAS weaknesses. 
A. WEAKNESSES DUE TO PHYSICAL COMPONENTS 
Signatures emitted by physical components can be exploited by an adversary to 
detect UAS.  For example, the heat signature can be exploited by the adversary’s thermal 
imager to detect, identify, and classify.  The airframe reflects radar energy directed at it, 
so if it is not designed to minimize radar cross-section, the UA may be detected by the 
adversary’s air defense radars. 
Degradation of many of these physical components may also result in the 
destruction of UAS subsystem.  A direct hit from the adversary’s artillery on the GCS 
may mean the destruction of the GCS and possibly death to the operators inside it.  A hit 
(direct or indirect) to the UA’s fuel system may result in the rupture of the fuel lines, and 
cause the UA to crash as it runs out of fuel (unless it lands before this happens). 
B. WEAKNESSES DUE TO PERFORMING FUNCTIONS 
UAS, while performing some functions, may emit signatures that can be detected 
by the adversary.  For example, the communication between the GCS and UA allows an 
adversary with radio direction-finding equipment to locate the positions of the GCS 
and/or UA.  UAS is especially susceptible to such detection if constant communication 
between the GCS and UA is maintained. 
The adversary can also cause the degradation of some UAS functions so as to 
affect the effectiveness of UAS or even its destruction.  For example, the data link 
between the GCS and UA can be jammed by the adversary such that the operator cannot 
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send commands to the UA to change altitude, speed, and direction to avoid a mountain.  
This will lead to the UA eventually crashing. 
C. IDENTIFY UAS WEAKNESSES 
Each component identified in the physical decomposition performed earlier (see 
Figure 16 and each function identified in the functional decomposition performed (see 
Figure 17) is examined to see whether it emits signature that can be detected by potential 
threats (see Chapter IV), and whether the loss or degradation of the component or 
function will lead to the destruction of UAS subsystem.  The physical results are 
presented in Table 4 and the functional results are indicated in Table 5. 
  
Table 4.   Physical Components That Either Emit Signal Or If Degraded, Will Lead To 

























































Airframe x x  x x x x    
Propulsion x x  x x x x   x 
Communications/Identification System           
Navigation System        x x x 
Fuel System    x x x x    
Electrical System    x x x x   x 
Central Computer    x x x x  x x 
Automatic Flight Control System    x x x x  x x 
Auxiliary Equipment           


























































Ground Control Station 
UA Data Display and Controls      x x  x x 
Mission Planning Equipment      x x  x x 
Communications System   x   x x x x x 
Shelter      x x    
Auxiliary Equipment      x x    
Others 
Payload x x x x x x x x x x 
Launch & Recovery System x x    x x  x x 
Ground Support Equipment x x    x x  x x 
 










































Understand Mission  x 
Identify Threats Locations   
Know about Area of Operations  x 
Identify Target Areas  x 










































Decide on Number of UA Required for Mission   
Decide on Number of Crew and Rotation Needed  x 
Perform Pre-flight Tasks  x 
Launch UA  x 
Fly x x 
Navigate  x 
Control Flight (Autonomously or Manually)  x 
Communicate between Operator and UA x x 
Maintain Situational Awareness of Operator  x 
Operate Payload x x 
Install the Right Payload on UA   
Arrive at Area of Operations x  
Maintain Coverage Over Target Area for Required Time x  
Send Images/Videos to Operator x  
Interpret Images/Videos  x 
Maintain UA in State that is Optimal/Necessary for Payload 
Operation x  
Avoid Being Hit by Damage Mechanism from Adversary   
Avoid Being Killed by Damage   
Recover UA  x 
Perform Post-flight Tasks   
Perform Preventive Maintenance  x 
Perform Corrective Maintenance  x 










































Provide Spares x x 
Train Operators, Intelligence Officers (to Interpret what the UA sees), 
and Technicians  x 
Provide Integrated Logistic Support x x 
Transport UA, GCS, and Other Support Equipment to Launch Site or 
From Recovery Site x  
Store UA, GCS, and Other Related Equipment   
Provide Intelligence that the Supported Unit Requires x  
Supported Unit Tells UA Operator Area of Operations x  
 
Results in Table 4 and Table 5 are then translated into UAS weaknesses.  Combat 
survivability enhancement concepts indentified in Chapter II can be used to improve or 
eliminate these weaknesses.  These weaknesses and their corresponding survivability 
enhancement concepts are identified and summarized in Table 6.  These concepts will be 








Table 6.   UAS Weaknesses And Corresponding Survivability Enhancement Concepts To 
Improve Or Eliminate Weaknesses 
Weaknesses Survivability Enhancement Concepts 
Some components such as airframe and 
propulsion system have large RCS 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Using expendables to distract threat 
propagator 
Some components such as airframe and 
propulsion system have high IR signature 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Using expendables to distract threat 
propagator 
Damages to various components such as fuel 
system, electrical system, central computers, 
etc. can lead to the destruction of UAS 
• Suppress damage 
• Install redundant components (with 
separation) 
• Locate critical components in a way 
that reduce probability of the damage 
from killing UAS 
• Shield critical components 
• Eliminate components 
The communication system and payload are 
susceptible to jamming 
• Improve performance (of these 
components) 
• Suppress threat 
• Increase stand-off range 
• Suppress damage 
Some components that are software-driven are 
susceptible to software virus attack 
• Gather intelligence about threat 
• Warn about presence of threat 
• Suppress threat 
• Suppress damage 
Various components are susceptible to EMP 
attack 
• Shield critical components 
• Eliminate components 
Degradation of some functions related to 
mission planning (i.e., understand the mission, 
know about area of operations, identify threat 
• Gather intelligence about threat 
• Warn about presence of threat 
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Weaknesses Survivability Enhancement Concepts 
area) will lead to UAS destruction 
The performance of some functions emits 
signature that can be detected by the adversary 
(i.e., communicate between operator and UA, 
operating payload) 
• Warn about presence of threat 
• Improve system performance 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Tactics and training 
The performance of some support functions 
not only emit a signature that can be detected 
by the adversary, the degradation of these 
functions may lead to the destruction of UAS 
(i.e., provide integrated logistic support, 
supported unit tells UA operator area of 
operations) 
• Gather intelligence about threat 
• Warn about presence of threat 
• Jam/deceive sensor 
• Reduce signature of UAS 
• Tactics and training 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The adversary can exploit UAS weaknesses to detect, identify, and track UAS or 
attack the weaknesses to destroy it.  This chapter identified the weaknesses.  Combat 
survivability enhancement options will be identified in the next chapter to ameliorate or 
eliminate these weaknesses. 
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VI. COMBAT SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS 
A. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
A standard “one size fits all” solution to unmanned aircraft combat survivability is 
not available due to the wide range of sizes and performances of the UA.  Smaller UA 
limited by size, weight carrying capability, and power is unlikely to be able to support 
survivability enhancements that will add (much) more weight and/or require (much) more 
power from the UA.  Combat survivability enhancement options are thus very limited for 
smaller UAs.  The larger UA, on the other hand, may have more options.  There is a 
higher possibility that larger UAs can support active susceptibility reduction features 
such as electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures, threat-warning equipment, and/or 
vulnerability reduction features such as fire suppression equipment, self-sealing fuel 
tanks.  However, as many UAs are not initially designed with much combat survivability 
in mind, there may be limited ability to enhance survivability before UAS reach their 
engineering limits.  For example, designers usually leave little power margin for payloads 
and other equipment; therefore, considerations need to be made for power requirements 
of the enhancement options or the implementation of innovative power management 
techniques.  That being said, some combat survivability enhancement options are worth 
considering. 
1. Increase Operating Altitude 
One combat survivability enhancement option is to increase the operating altitude.  
It can be expected that when one flies higher, there will likely be less threats that can 
reach it.  During Desert Storm, Allied aircraft changed their tactics from low-altitude 
flights and strikes to medium-altitude (10,000 to 20,000 ft) so as to avoid enemy AAA 
[30,31].  Most AAA and SAMs have engagement altitudes that are up to 15,000 ft; 
therefore if the operating altitude of the UA can be increased to 15,000 ft or more, the 
threats faced by the UA can be reduced to only long range radar-guided SAMs and 
fighter aircraft. 
 62
Unless it is already designed with a flight ceiling higher than 15,000 ft, an 
existing UA will need to make physical changes in order to reach this altitude.  To reach 
this altitude, modifications to the UA need to be made.  To gain altitude, the lift must be 
greater than the total weight of the UA.  As can be seen in Equation 1, lift force produced 
by a wing is related to the wing profile, density of the air (d) and velocity of the airflow 
over it (v). 
 2L Bdv=   (1) 
where L is the lift in Newtons, d is the air density, and v is the velocity.  The factor B 
depends on the profile of the wing (length and width). 
Modifications to make a UA fly higher therefore must at least change the wing 
profile, increase velocity, or decrease weight.  They may include replacing existing wings 
with ones that can generate more lift, replacing the propulsion system with one that can 
produce more thrust, lightening the UA by replacing current payloads with lighter 
payloads, or removing non-critical components, etc. 
The altitude that the UA may go to is also limited by its sensor.  If the sensor has 
poor resolution performance, the UA will need to fly lower to obtain a usable image with 
an acceptable clarity.  Also, if the payload is an optic sensor, the UA will need fly below 
cloud cover to obtain the image. 
2. Change Operating Speed 
The analysis by a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master’s student, Kevin 
McMindes, suggested that a speed of at least 135 kts is required to ensure robust 
survivability regardless of threat, and survivability will increase appreciably up to about 
225 kts [32].  McMindes simulated an UA performing a reconnaissance mission over a 
target area defended by air defense units and infantry.  The UA was modeled with various 
stealth levels, senor detection ranges, operating altitude, and speed.  Although the quoted 
figures may only be applicable to scenarios studied in McMindes’ analysis, his results 
show that fast speeds for a UA has a positive effect on survivability. 
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Unless the existing UA already has the capability for high speed dashes, 
increasing operating speed will require modifications to it.  Modifications can be as 
“simple” as replacing the propulsion system with one that produces more thrust; or as 
complex as changing the aerodynamics of the UA so as to reduce drag. 
Depending on the mission, a high operating speed may not always be desirable.  
For example, a high speed may not allow the sensor operator enough time to differentiate 
a target of interest from the background before the UA flies out of the area, and thus the 
target is missed. 
Other than increasing the operating speed, it may also be reduced to enhance 
combat survivability.  If the UA is flying slowly enough such that it is outside the 
velocity gate of the adversary’s radars, the radars will filter away the UA’s radar returns.  
The adversary therefore is unable to detect the UA with his radars. 
Intelligence on the limits of the adversary’s radar velocity gate needs to be 
gathered before this option can become effective.  The lower limit must also be higher 
than the UA’s stall speed before the option can be implemented.  To achieve a low flying 
speed, modifications to the existing UA may be needed to change its aerodynamic 
characteristics. 
3. Improve Situational Awareness 
The situational awareness of an operator sitting in the GCS is limited by the 
sensor’s field of view.  Only what is detected in the sensor field is seen by the operator.  
The operator may not know that the UA is being tracked by the adversary’s radar and 
guns or missiles have been fired at it.  The operator’s first sign of trouble will likely be 
when contact is lost with the UA.  He or she may not know what hit the aircraft, much 
less is he or she able to perform maneuvers or employ countermeasures.  The operator 
may not even realize that the UA was shot down by hostile fire.  The commander may 
send another asset into the area to investigate the crash, thus exposing the asset to danger, 
o another asset may be sent to perform the same mission along the same route, thus 
exposing the asset to the same threat.  Improving the operator’s situational awareness 
thus is another way to enhance combat survivability. 
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Situational awareness can be improved by installing warning systems.  The 
warning system may provide sufficient, timely, accurate and prioritized information on 
relevant threats to support decisions on further actions [33].  Warning systems include 
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) system, Missile Warning Systems (MWS), and Laser 
Warning Systems (LWS). 
a. Radar Warning Receiver System 
The RWR system is a passive warning system that is effective against 
radio frequency (RF) threats such as radars.  The RWR system measures the frequency, 
pulse width, amplitude, angle of arrival, and time of arrival of all RF signals it detects.  
As the majority of RF threats against the aircraft transmit at between 2 and 18 GHz, 
RWR systems are typically designed to cover this region [26].  The measured parameters 
are then compared by the system against a library of known emitters to distinguish 
whether the RF signal is from a friend or foe, the type of radar that is emitting the signal, 
and the modes of operation of the radar.  The amplitude and time/angle of arrival are also 
used to determine the direction and approximate distance to the emitter [34].  To be able 
to perform all the above and yet provide sufficient and timely warning too, the RWR 
system requires (and should possess) real-time signal processing capabilities. 
For platforms operating at high altitude a RWR system that can handle a 
high pulse densities is favorable, while a platform operating at low altitude can use a less 
complex and cheaper RWR system with less capability to handle high pulse densities. 
RWR systems, with better capabilities, have the option of carrying out 
secondary missions of ELINT – to gather the electronic order of battle of the adversary. 
A typical RWR system consists of the following physical components: 
• Antennas (usually four) 
• Receivers 
• Signal processor 
• Control unit 
• Display unit (for a UAS, this will be located in the GCS) 
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Figure 18 shows an example of a RWR system.  The LR-100 is a 
RWR/electronic support measures (ESM)/electronic intelligence (ELINT) receiver 
system.  Weighing 73 lbs, the LR-100 has been marketed by Northrop Grumman 
Corporation as combat-proven and is well suited for installation on virtually any air, sea, 
or land-based platform, including lightweight UAs [35]. 
 
Figure 18.   The LR-100 RWR System Shown with Azimuth Antenna Interferometer Unit 
(Four Each), Antenna Interface Unit, and Receiver Processor Unit [From 35]. 
 
RWR has the advantage of detecting radar signatures at long ranges.  This 
allows the operator to maneuver the UA away from the threat sphere before any weapon 
is used against it. 
b. Missile Warning System 
A MWS is effective in detecting all incoming missiles (regardless of 
whether RF-, IR-, Laser- or TV-guided), and it warns the operator when the UA is being 
shot at.  This, incidentally, is also one of the leading requirements that come out from 
recent conflicts (in Iraq and Afghanistan) [36].  Other than being able to warn about 
incoming missiles, the MWS can also provide information about the time to intercept as 
well as the direction of the approaching missile and trigger launch of countermeasures 
[37]. 
 66
There are three types of MWS, each using a different type of detector: 1) 
radar detector (using either continuous wave or pulse Doppler), 2) IR detector, and 3) UV 
detector.  Most MWS use UV detectors.  These detectors are effective in detecting 
missiles of older generations, but many modern missiles are now able to defeat them.  
UV detectors are also unable to detect post-burnout of missiles, thus restricting the 
detection range.  MWS using IR detectors may be a better choice as they, being able to 
continue detecting missiles in post-burnout phases, can track the missiles for a longer 
period.  Also, being passive detectors, MWS using IR detectors require less power than 
MWS that use radar detectors.  As a testimony to MWS with IR detectors, the USAF, 
U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps are in the progress of replacing their UV detector-
based MWS with a third generation MWS that uses infrared detectors [36].  The strengths 
and weakness of each type of MWS is summarized in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.   Strengths and Weaknesses Of Various MWS Technologies [After 33]. 
Type Properties 
PD operates in a different band (e.g. L) to avoid ESM/RWR systems 
operating above 2 GHz. 
Strengths Long range, all-weather, controllable false alarm rate, and independent of missile emissions 
Radar - Pulse 
Doppler (PD) 
Weaknesses 
Active transmitter, strong ground clutter at low altitudes, 
the RCS of new missiles are decreasing so more difficult 
to detect. 
IR detection typically in 3-5 μ m band 




IR considered) Weaknesses 
Performance strongly limited by clutter, risk for 
saturation at short ranges due to the need for high 
sensitivity to provide long range detection, complex 






UV detection of missile plume in the solar-blind region at 0.2-0.3 μ m 
band; built around an image-intensifier 
Strengths 
Minimal background clutter, hence lower demand on 
signal processing and reduced complexity; no cooling 
required; matured technology; lower cost 
Ultraviolet 
(UV) 
Weaknesses No post-burnout detection, restricted detection range due to ozone attenuation, UV clutter from man-made sources 
 
A typical passive MWS consists of the following: 
• One (revolving) to four (fixed) sensors 
• Processor or electronic control unit 
 
An Active MWS consists of the following: 
• Antennas 
• Receiver/transmitter unit 
• Buffer storage unit 
 
A MWS has the advantage of detecting all types of missiles or even 
aircraft that is being launched at the UA.  However, the MWS only works after a weapon 
is launched at the UA, and therefore a quick reacting countermeasure is required to defeat 
the incoming threat. 
c. Laser Warning System 
A LWS is effective in detecting laser designation, laser beam riding 
missiles, etc.  It is capable of determining the type of laser received and the direction of 
arrival.  A LWS is also able to provide information on pulse repetition intervals so that it 




A typical LWS consists of the following: 
• Sensors (usually six for an aircraft, each covering 90o from bore 
sight and about ± 45o in elevation) 
• Processor 
A LWS offers little time between the realizations of the UA being lased 
and a weapon being launched at it; therefore, a countermeasure is required to defeat the 
incoming threat (weapon). 
d. Considerations for Choosing Warning System 
It is unlikely that the UA, with its power and space constraints, will be 
able to install all three types of warning systems; therefore, careful considerations are 
needed in choosing the right warning system.  Factors to consider include the type of 
threat the UA is likely to encounter, the size and power requirements of the warning 
system, and integration with other systems already existing on the UA. 
Information about the three warning systems is summarized in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   Summary of Threat Warning Systems. 
RWR MWS LWS 
• Passive • Passive or active • Passive 
• Detects RF threats only. • Detects both RF and 
IR-guided missiles or 
any incoming threat 
that emits exhaust 
plume (other aircraft, 
etc.), but not able to 
detect AAA. 
• Detects only threats 






RWR MWS LWS 
• Medium to long lead-time 
between detecting RF 
threat and threat firing at 
UA. 
• Short to medium lead-
time between detecting 
threat and threat 
reaching UA. 
• Short to medium lead-
time between detecting 
laser guided threat and 
threat firing at UA. 
• Combat survivability can 
be enhanced without 
installing 
countermeasures. 
• Combat survivability 
can only be enhanced if 
countermeasure is 
installed. 
• Combat survivability 




4. Countering Incoming Threats 
In some instances it may sufficient to install only the warning system to enhance 
combat survivability.  For example, if RWR is installed, it may be able to detect that the 
UA is being tracked by the adversary’s radar.  The operator can then decide to take 
evasive maneuvers like exiting the threat sphere before any anti-aircraft weapon can be 
used on the UA.  However, in many other instances, it may be too late for the UA to exit 
the threat volume or the mission requires it to stay on course.  The adversary may then 
launch a missile or send its fighters out to intercept the UA.  Countering the incoming 
threat may be necessary. 
a. Install Electronic Countermeasures 
One way of countering incoming threats is to install electronic 
countermeasures (CM).  Electronic CMs can be broadly classified into four categories: 1) 
RFCM, 2) Laser CM, 3) IRCM and 4) communication CM.  Only the first three types of 
CM will be discussed here, as the fourth CM will be discussed later under data link.  The 





(1) RFCM – Chaff 
The simplest countermeasure against radar is chaff.  First used in 
WWII, chaffs are small strips of conducting materials (normally dipoles made of 
aluminum or thin glass fibers coated with aluminum or zinc) whose length is selected to 
make them good reflectors of radar energy.  This length is half the radar wavelength that 
it is trying to counter [38].  Strands of chaffs are bundled together in cartridges or 
cassettes to be dispensed when needed.  In order to be able to counter radars of different 
frequencies, strands of chaff in a cartridge are cut to different lengths to respond to 
different frequencies.  When the radar wavelength is matched with the physical length of 
chaff strong returns are achieved, and the radar sees a larger target than the chaff 
physically is. 
When dispensed, the chaff will form a cloud.  The cloud will grow 
due to turbulence caused by the dispensing aircraft, natural air turbulence, differences in 
fall rates among the chaff, and prevailing wind.  The chaff cloud needs to bloom rapidly 
so that the radar sees both the aircraft and the chaff in the same range bin.  An air-
launched chaff typically takes about 50 milliseconds to bloom [38].  Since high turbulent 
flow makes the chaff cloud grow rapidly, forward of, but not in line with, wing roots and 
the engine exhaust are good locations for the chaff dispenser.  Some radars are able to 
reject second echoes that suddenly appear near the rear of their targets.  To confuse these 
radars, some dispensers eject the chaff forward of the aircraft [13]. 
The effectiveness of chaff is not guaranteed.  As chaff is light, it 
has insignificant momentum and loses speed rapidly after deployment.  If the threat radar 
has sophisticated pulse-Doppler or moving target indicator signal processing capability, it 
will be able to distinguish the echoes of the near stationary chaff clouds from the echoes 
of the moving aircraft.  Skilled radar operators can also track the UA through the chaff 
even though the tracking accuracy will likely be degraded. 
The effectiveness of chaff is influenced by the UA’s flight path 
after the chaff are ejected, the ability of the chaff cloud to provide the necessary radar 
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cross-section (RCS), the ability to remain aloft, and whether or not there is sufficient 
movement in the chaff cloud to provide a Doppler frequency shift. 
The location of the dispenser is also important.  The dispenser 
needs to be located such that chaff can bloom rapidly, yet the dispenser does not affect 
the aerodynamics of the UA drastically. 
(2) RFCM - RF Jammer 
The objective of an RF jammer is to introduce a noise-like signal 
into the radar system to mask or obscure the target echo [37] so as to impair the ability of 
the adversary’s radar to detect and track.  The jammer generates the noise (at a level 
above the adversary’s radar threshold) either continuously or intermittently and directs it 
into the radar.  Noise is seen on the radar screen as a relative large area of clutter. 
Three general techniques are used by the jammers.  The first is 
broadband or barrage jamming.  This is used when the radar frequency is either unknown 
or changing, or when there are multiple radars (operating at different frequencies) to be 
jammed.  Jammers using barrage jamming transmit a noise signal in a frequency range 
that is much wider than the operating bandwidth of the radar.  The second technique is 
spot jamming and is used when the radar frequency is known.  The jammer transmits in a 
relatively narrow frequency band that is centered at the radar frequency and usually 
somewhat larger than the radar bandwidth.  The third technique is swept jamming.  The 
jammer transmits a noise signal of a narrow bandwidth in a rapid and repetitive sweeping 
manner across the range of frequencies to be jammed.  Spot jamming is more efficient 
and requires less power as the noise signal bandwidth can be limited and directed.  A 
RWR system is therefore valuable in this case as it can provide frequency and direction 
information that enables spot jamming. 
As long as information about an adversary's radar (direction, 
frequency, angle, etc.) is known, noise jammers with adequate noise powers can degrade 
the radar’s performance.  One great limitation of noise jammers is that they require 
relatively high power as they may operate at 100% duty cycle.  Low-power jammers may 
also not be sufficient in denying the adversary’s radars from gathering directional 
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information about the UA.  Since UAs are weight- and power-constrained platforms, it is 
unlikely that the high-powered noise jammers will find their way into many UAs. 
(3) RFCM – RF Deceivers 
The objective of RF deceivers is to fool, confuse, or mislead the 
adversary’s radar.  Also known as deception jammers, repeaters or spoofers, RF 
deceivers fool radar systems by presenting false target information.  Radar deception 
follows one of the following two general approaches: 1) generates large numbers of 
indistinguishable false targets to overload the radar, or 2) provides incorrect target 
bearing, range, or velocity information to the radar. 
Many deception techniques are available today.  The more 
common techniques include range gate pull-off, inverse con-scan, and angle deception 
[13, 37].  Radar deceivers typically require less power than noise jammers.  This is 
especially true for deceivers countering pulse radars, as their duty cycles are comparable 
to the radar duty cycles (which are not 100% duty cycles).  Disregarding size, the radar 
deceiver may thus be more suitable for UAs with power constraints.  Some systems have 
both jamming and deceiving capabilities. 
(4) RFCM - RF Decoy 
The objective of decoys is to draw an attacking missile away from 
the targets the decoys are protecting.  Decoys achieve their objectives by making 
themselves more attractive to the attacker.  Decoys can be classified into the following 
two categories: flying decoys and towed decoys. 
Flying decoys are able to navigate on their own and can be self-
powered or unpowered.  They can be passive by only simulating the characteristics of the 
aircraft they are protecting (flight path, speed, RCS, etc.) or they can be active by 
carrying a radar jammer/deceiver.  The McDonnell ADM-20 Quail is an example of a 
passive self-powered flying decoy.  It presents radar images very similar to that of the B-
52 and has similar flying characteristics of the B-52. 
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Towed decoys protect their host aircraft by emitting deceiving 
signals to seduce an attacking missile to themselves and away from their host.  Computer 
simulations have shown that towed decoys can effectively reduce the probability of kill 
of UAs.  This includes even UAs with limited maneuverability [39].  Towed decoys can 
generate both the signals by themselves (repeater decoys) or by a countermeasure system 
onboard the host aircraft and linked to the decoy by a fiber-optic cable.  The second 
option of placing the countermeasures system onboard ensures that the more expensive 
countermeasure system can be used several times, and thus the cost of the decoy can be 
kept low.  However, as most UAs have power and space constraints, it is unlikely that the 
second option can be used.  Figure 20 shows the different configurations of airborne 
towed decoys.  The configuration at the top shows the decoy having all components 
needed to generate a signal.  This is the most expensive configuration but is suitable for 
more UAs.  The configuration at the bottom shows a configuration where all components 
needed to generate the signal reside onboard the host aircraft.  The decoy works as an 
antenna in this case.  It is the least expensive configuration but is unsuitable for most 
UAs. 
The towed decoy may or may not be recoverable.  The RQ-4 
Global Hawk is to be equipped with the AN/ALE-50 Towed Decoy System.  These 
decoys are not recoverable.  At an estimated cost of $22,000 each [40], these decoys can 
be considered inexpensive when used to protect a RQ-4A that costs $37.6 million each 
[41].  Trades between combat survivability and cost have to be made as well. 
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Figure 20.   Different Configuration of Airborne Towed Decoy [From 37]. 
 
Due to power and physical constraints of existing UAs, it can be 
expected that there will be many difficulties in equipping them with towed decoys.  If the 
benefit of using flying decoys (i.e., costs avoided when the UA that the decoys are 
protecting are not shot down) outweighs the cost of operating and supporting the decoys, 




(5) IRCM – Flare 
Flares are pyrotechnics designed to emit large amounts of radiation 
in the sensor bandwidth of an IR-guided missile to draw attacking IR-guided missiles 
away from the aircraft they are protecting.  An IR-guided missile tracks the centroid of all 
the IR energy within its field of view.  As a flare radiates significantly more IR energy 
than the aircraft it is protecting, the energy centroid is closer to the flare.  This centroid 
starts to move away from the protected aircraft as the flare separates from the aircraft.  
Once the aircraft leaves the tracking field of view of the missile, the missile hones in on 
just the flare [43]. 
Modern IR-guided missiles, unfortunately, have features to reject 
flares.  One such feature is the “two-color” IR detector.  The energy level at each 
wavelength is unique for different temperatures.  As shown in Figure 21, the spectral 
radiance versus wavelength curves are significantly different shapes for different 
temperatures.  The detector measures the spectral radiant intensity in two wavelengths 
and compares the relative intensity in each wavelength to distinguish between the cooler 
aircraft (at 700 K) and the hotter flare (at 2,000 K). 
Advanced flares consisting of an ensemble (cocktail) of flares can 
counter this two-color tracking.  Each flare peaks in a different waveband, such that the 
combined signature matches that of the aircraft.  Research is underway to replace the 
cocktails with new single materials that can match target spectral signatures [42].  The 
effectiveness of the flares will be influenced by the UA’s flight path after the flares were 
ejected, flare burn time, power output and spectral distribution, distribution of flares 
around the aircraft, and flare trajectories. 
The systems safety aspect of using flares also has to be considered.  
When released below 1,000 ft, some conventional flares can cause ground fires [42].  
Regardless of whether it will be released automatically or on command by operators in 




accidental release of flares over civilian areas (especially during peacetime).  The risk of 
the inadvertent release of flares needs to be kept to a minimum before flares can be 
installed on UAs. 
 
Figure 21.   A Two-color Sensor can Determine the Temperature of its Target by Comparing 
the Energy at Two Frequencies [From 43]. 
 
(6) IRCM - IR Deceivers 
IR deceivers introduce false target information to fool the IR 
tracker.  This is done by using modulated IR signals in the sensor bandwidth.  These 
modulated signals need energy levels that are higher than those from the aircraft the 
deceiver is protecting. 
The IR deceiver requires information about the reticle modulation 
frequency of the missile it is trying to deceive.  This can be measured by scanning the 
missile tracker with a laser and observing the reflected energy.  Once the modulation 
frequency information is obtained, an erroneous pulse pattern can then be produced to 
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cause the missile tracker to produce incorrect steering commands.  Following erroneous 
steering commands, the IR-guided missile will then fly away from the protected aircraft. 
There are several sources of IR radiation that an IR deceiver can 
use, such as a xenon lamp, arc lamp, and heated ceramics (heated by electricity or aircraft 
fuel).  The lamps can be pulsed to create amplitude modulated signals.  Meanwhile, 
shutters can be installed over the heated ceramics and then exposed by following a 
pattern so as to produce a modulated signal.  UAs with power constraints can choose 
ceramics heated by fuel. 
(7) IRCM - IR Jammers 
Similar to RF jammers, IR jammers produces large amounts of IR 
noise in the sensor bandwidth to saturate the IR detector.  Some IR jammers are also able 
to damage the detector or the optics, causing the seeker to go blind.  IR jammers typically 
are directed high-energy systems.  An example of one would use a high-power laser to 
saturate or damage the seeker optics.  As IR jammers can be laser countermeasures too, 
more will be discussed in the next section. 
(8) Laser Countermeasure 
Countermeasures against laser-guided threats can be broadly 
classified into active and passive countermeasures [43].  Active countermeasures include 
directing a high-power laser into the seeker's optics to either saturate the sensor or to 
damage it.  A low-power laser can also be used instead to introduce erroneous signals 
into the guidance system and cause the threat to miss the UA.  Passive countermeasures 
work by obscuring the target so that the adversary has difficulty tracking the target and 
maintaining proper aim using the laser.  Smoke is an example of a laser countermeasure. 
b. Arm UA to Shoot at Incoming Threats 
As most UAs are not armed to dogfight another aircraft in the air, with the 
exception of an intentional collision, they pose no threat to an attacking manned fighter 




at the UA.  However, if the UA is armed to fire back at the fighter, the pilot will be 
forced to launch his weapon at a longer range or from a less optimal position.  This 
increases the possibility of the missile missing the UA. 
During OIF, some Predators were armed with Stinger missiles.  When an 
MIG-25 was sent to intercept one of these Predators, both aircrafts launched their 
missiles at each other.  The dogfight ended with the Predator being killed when the 
MIG’s missile found the Predator while the Predator’s missile was diverted by the MIG’s 
missile, thus missing its mark [44].  Though this example ended in failure, it showed the 
potential of a UA fighting back.  If a UA can be armed with more lethal air-to-air missiles 
and are able to find their targets during engagements, the adversary commander will be 
forced to weigh the risk of losing a pilot sent to attack an unmanned aircraft versus the 
benefit of destroying the UA. 
To enable this option, UA wings will likely need strengthening to 
withstand the load of the missiles.  The wings will also need to be wired to send launch 
commands to the missiles. 
5. Reduce Signature 
Small UAs can have large RCS that makes them easy to be detected by radars.  
Some UAs can have acoustic signatures that, even though can not be heard by unaided 
ears, can still be easily picked up by existing sound detection systems.  Reducing 
signatures to make it harder for the threat system to detect, locate, and identify the UA is 
therefore important.  Radar absorbent materials (RAM) can be applied to the UA to 
reduce radar echoes, existing engines can be replaced with engines that produce less heat, 
propulsion systems using propellers can be replaced with blades that produce less noise, 
and camouflage patterns can be applied to the UA to reduce its contrast with the 
surroundings so as to reduce visual radiations. 
It is possible to reduce UA signatures without making any structural modification, 




UA.  Since smaller UAs typically have many size and power constraints, signature 
reduction must be considered as an enhancement option for smaller UAs, as this may be 
the only combat survivability enhancement option that is feasible to them. 
6. Strengthen Damage Tolerance 
Ways to strengthen an existing UA to withstand damage (or reduce vulnerability) 
includes adding redundant critical components and installing them in separate locations, 
repositioning critical components to minimize exposure to threat, installing passive or 
active damage suppression components (such as self-sealing fuel tanks), shielding critical 
components with armor, and reducing parts count. 
The degree of damage tolerance strengthening that will be applied is a function of 
UA size, cost, and operating environment.  Therefore, it is unlikely that many 
vulnerability reduction features will be applicable to smaller UAs that are usually less 
expensive. 
7. Improve Autonomy 
It is arguable that the "Achilles’ heel" of a UAS is the requirement for 
communication between the UA and GCS.  If the uplink (where commands are sent to the 
UA) is lost, the UA becomes a “headless” chicken.  Most UAs are programmed to fly to a 
predetermined location should the communication uplink be lost for a predetermined 
period of time.  This means that if the adversary is able to disrupt the communication 
uplink, the UA may not be able to perform its mission. 
Therefore, one way to enhance the UA’s combat survivability is to reduce or 
remove the UA’s dependence on commands from the GCS.  Autonomy of the UA can be 
increased.  Some UAs like the Global Hawk and Herti are able to take off, fly to the 
target area, and land autonomously.  There are already technologies in place for a UA to 
be programmed to perform basic mission functions such as maintaining persistent 
surveillance over a target area.  To increase the autonomy of existing UAs requires 
software changes to both the UA and GCS and installation of flight measurement 
equipment with higher fidelity so that the flight status can be determined more accurately. 
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8. Redundant Navigation Systems 
Many UAs, due to space and weight constraints, install only one type of 
navigation system, with the most common type being Global Positioning System (GPS).  
GPS offers accurate navigation but is dependant on satellite signals that can be jammed.  
Any denial of GPS service will affect the mission effectiveness of the UA.  It is therefore 
necessary to install another navigation system that uses a different technology as backup. 
A prime candidate is the Inertia Navigation System (INS).  The INS is a passive 
system and does not require another system to measure its position.  It finds its current 
position by calculating the linear displacements from a last known position.  However, 
INS has a position error (i.e., drift) that builds up over time.  As the elapsed time of the 
operation increases, the position information generated by the INS becomes less accurate.  
The position errors can be corrected periodically with readings from the GPS (when it is 
not jammed).  Regardless of its shortcomings, the INS is still a feasible backup system 
that provides reasonably accurate position information when the GPS is jammed. 
Other alternatives include navigation using a compass and radio navigation using 
a data link.  An electrical compass can provide heading information to the UA mission 
computer (for autonomous flight) and operator.  A data link can be used to determine the 
position of a UA by measuring its azimuth and range from the GCS antenna. 
The installation of a backup navigation system will be limited by the weight, 
space and power constraints of a UA.  Careful trade studies must be made to consider the 
level of threat to the navigational system, importance of accurate navigation, and impact 
of a backup system on mission performance. 
B. PAYLOAD 
Like the UA, payload is also susceptible to threats, even though it is more likely 
that an adversary will attack the UA instead of targeting only the payload.  Payloads are 
susceptible to electronic attacks.  Lasers can be shined into the optic sensor to 




or the laser energy level is very high).  Noise jamming techniques can be used against 
radars and communication relay systems so as to degrade their performance or even deny 
their usage.  There is a need for the payload to apply self-protection against such threats. 
An optical sensor can be protected by controlling the amount of transmitted 
energy into the detector.  The light level to the detector can be monitored by a sensor 
which in turn will activate a modulator or shutter to protect the detector from excessively 
strong light levels.  This is similar to a person's eyelids protecting his or her eyes from 
strong lights.  Another method is to use narrow-line spectral filters [45].  These filters can 
be placed in front of the lens of the optical sensors to block rays of certain frequencies.  
However, the laser wavelength needs to be known for this protection method to work 
well. 
Sensor performance also has an effect on the combat survivability of UAS, 
especially the UA.  For most optical sensors, the aperture sizes determine the standoff 
distance between the UA and the target (and threats).  There have been many cases where 
a UA needs to fly low for better electro-optical and infrared imagery [46].  The curves in 
Figure 22 represent the minimum aperture sizes that are consistent with being able to 
perform a given perceptual function at a specified range for various sensors. 
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Figure 22.   Aperture Size Requirements for Different Sensors and Imaging Functions [From 
47]. 
 
The returns (in terms of enhancing UAS combat survivability) gained from 
replacing existing sensors with better performing ones will likely be more than if only 
payload protection is implemented.  As sensor technologies improve over time, this 
enhancement option will become more affordable and feasible. 
C. GROUND ELEMENT 
Even though GCS is part of UAS, the UA is often the focus of any UAS 
survivability discussion, thus neglecting the GCS.  The GCS plays an equally important 
role in a UAS and its combat survivability should not be neglected.  The ground 
components of a UAS are usually less well-defended [27].  Considering the importance 




The best way to ensure combat survivability of the GCS is to prevent the 
adversary from locating the GCS.  There are several ways that the adversary can gather 
intelligence on a GCS location.  One way is to use radio direction-finding techniques.  As 
most UAs require constant communication with the GCS, adversaries can detect the 
communication signals and employ direction-finding techniques to locate the GCS.  Once 
the GCS is located, the adversary can either capture the GCS by force or destroy it with 
bombardments. 
Methods to reduce the likelihood of an adversary locating the GCS include 
reducing the probability of intercept of the communication channel, minimizing 
communications between the GCS and UA (i.e., by increasing the UA’s autonomy as 
discussed earlier), and locating the ground data terminal remotely (e.g. the EL/K-1861 
GDT can be located up to 5 km away from the GCS). 
Redundant ground control stations should also be deployed at different locations, 
distances apart.  Each GCS should have the capability of taking over control of the UA if 
a GCS is attacked or destroyed.  It is therefore important that each GCS is able to 
maintain communication coverage over the entire area of operations (either by direct 
LOS or through satellite communications). 
Another option is to position the GCS outside the reach of the threat.  The mission 
control element of the Global Hawk is located at Beale Air Force Base, California while 
the UA is performing its mission over Iraq, more than 7,000 miles away.  Being located 
outside the operation theatre makes it extremely difficult for any adversary from Iraq to 
attack the GCS.  This option, however, requires a communication relay (e.g., satellite) as 
it is unlikely that direct LOS communications can be established at such long distances.  
This increases the cost of operating UAS, and there may be delays in the communication 
channel due to retransmission.  The impact of this delay on performance needs to be 
considered.  This option also introduces a new point of failure (the relay) into UAS.  
There may be a need to enhance the combat survivability of the relay so as to enhance the 
overall combat survivability of UAS. 
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As mission planning and controlling of the UA are performed using software, it is 
important that the software be free from viruses, Trojan horses, and other hostile software 
agents.  Proper computer security techniques and policies, such as installing firewalls and 
scanning every software program for malicious agents before installation, should be 
practiced at all times. 
Likewise, other ground elements, such as ground support equipment (GSE), has to 
be protected like the GCS to enhance their combat survivability.  There is usually little or 
no redundancy for the GSE.  If the GSE is damaged or destroyed, it may be impossible to 
recover a returning UA, repair a damaged UA, or even launch a UA for its next mission.  
The success of the campaign is thus affected.  One option to protect the GSE is to locate 
the equipment far from the GCS.  This will help to reduce the likelihood of collateral 
damage to the GSE should the GCS be attacked and vice versa.  This option, however, 
will increase the cost of defending the ground element as more troops will need to be 
deployed to different locations. 
D. DATA LINK 
Data links are arguably the "Achilles' heels" of UAS.  Adversaries using radio 
direction-finding techniques can locate the GCS and UA.  They can jam the data links to 
degrade the communication channel between the GCS and UA, thus preventing the GCS 
from receiving real-time information from the UA.  Adversaries may also use deception 
techniques to take control of the UA (by intruding the uplink) or send false signals to the 
GCS (by acting like the downlink).  Through deception, the adversaries may either 
command the UA to crash or give false status of the UA such that the operator will 
command the UA to descent until it crashes.  There may be a need to incorporate 
protection features into existing data links to enhance the overall combat survivability of 
UAS.  Features such as low probability of intercept (LPI), encryption, resistance to 
jamming, and resistance to deception can be considered. 
1. Low Probability of Intercept 
LPI reduces the likelihood of an adversary locating the GCS or UA through radio 
direction-finding techniques.  It is highly desirable for the uplink to have LPI 
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characteristics as the GCS, being stationary during operation, is easier to locate than the 
flying UA.  LPI can be provided by frequency spreading, frequency agility, power 
management, and low duty cycles.  In order to have the LPI characteristic, 
communication equipment on both the GCS and UA may need to be replaced.  The 
power, space, and weight constraints of the UA limit the amount of communication 
equipment with LPI characteristics that can be installed on the aircraft. 
2. Encryption 
Data links may be encrypted, but often are not.  Encryption makes it difficult for 
the adversary to understand the information when he is listening in on both the uplink and 
downlink.  If an adversary is able to intercept and understand the information exchanged 
between the GCS and UA, he or she may be able to use the information to fool the UA 
with bogus commands.  Encryption of the data links would reduce the possibility of 
successful interception and exploitation.  However, other than the above reason, 
encryption has little value in enhancing the combat survivability of UAS.  Uplink 
commands are real-time oriented and difficult for the adversary to exploit before they 
become stale.  No doubt that understanding the exchanged information may allow the 
adversary to locate the UA or know its next position, the adversary would more likely 
locate the UA through other sensors (like radars).  There are other enhancement options 
that can make the data links more resistance to deception.  This will be discussed later.  
The requirement to encrypt the data links will likely be more driven by operational 
security than by combat survivability. 
3. Resistance to Jamming 
No “jam resistant” data link is likely to be simple, operate in real-time, and have 
high-bandwidth.  Jam resistance is typically achieved by increasing the data link’s 
tolerance to jammer power before its operation degrades below an acceptable level.  This 
can be achieved by increasing either the transmitter power, antenna gain, or processing 
power. 
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a. Increasing Transmitter Power 
Increasing the transmitter power is the brute way of overcoming jamming.  
The aim is to generate more radiating power so as to beat the jammer in a power contest.  
This is akin to someone in a noisy market shouting above the crowd so that he can be 
heard.  To increase the transmitter power, more electrical power needs to be generated.  
Though this is achievable by a ground-based transmitter (by installing more generators), 
the space and weight constraints on a UA will likely make this option impossible.  This is 
therefore the least useful and feasible option for a UAS. 
b. Increasing Antenna Gain 
Another way to achieve the benefits of a high-power transmitter is to focus 
as much radiation as possible in the same direction.  This is done to increase the antenna 
gain.  At the transmitter end, the antenna gain concentrates the signal power into a narrow 
beam before directing it at the receiver.  It is necessary that the transmitter antenna is 
facing the receiver so that the transmission can be narrow.  The effective radiated power 
from such an arrangement is higher than that from an omni-directional antenna, thus 
increasing its likelihood to beat the jammer in the power contest.   
Gain at the receiver antenna discriminates between signal and jammer 
energy based on the directions from which the energy arrives at the antenna.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 23.  The communication signal will experience the full gain of the 
main beam of the antenna (GS in Figure 23) if the receiver antenna is pointed directly at 
the transmitter antenna.  The signal from a jammer antenna that the receiver antenna is 
not pointing directly at will experience only gain in a side lobe of the receiver antenna 
(GJ in Figure 23).  As the gain in the main lobe is much higher than gain from the side 
lobe, the wanted signal is therefore enhanced over the jammer signal by a factor of GS/GJ.  
This factor is dependent on the exact angles of arrival of the jammer energy and the 
structure of the side lobes of the antenna.  It is to be noted that this difference in gain will 
diminish as the jammer gets into the same line-of-sight between the UA and GCS (or any 
relay station). 
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Steerable antennas and tracking systems have to be installed so that the 
transmitter antenna can be pointed at the receiver antenna at all times.  Installation of a 
steerable antenna on the UA may add weight and affects the aerodynamics of the UA.  To 
have a high gain, the antenna needs to be big.  Due to space constraints of the UA, the 
airborne antenna may not be big enough to have much gain. 
 
Figure 23.   Illustration of the Geometrical Discrimination Between a Signal and a Jammer 
Using a High-Gain Antenna (GS and GJ are the Gain for the Desired Signal and 
Jammer Respectively) [From 14]. 
 
Where LOS can not be maintained between the UA and GCS, there is a 
need for a relay station.  This relay station may be a satellite, another airborne asset, or a 
ground asset.  The requirement of a relay station means great cost increase in increasing 
antenna gain to enhance jam resistance of the data link. 
c. Processing Gain 
Processing gain refers to enhancement of the signal relative to the jammer 
that results from forcing the jammer to spread its power out over a bandwidth that is 
greater than the information bandwidth of the signal communicated by the data link [14].   
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This is achieved by either direct spread-spectrum transmission or frequency hopping.  
Communication equipment on existing UAS may need to be replaced so as to achieve 
such capabilities. 
Processing gain, however, has the disadvantage of reducing data rates.  To 
get 30 dB Anti-Jam Margin5 downlink through processing gain, the transmission data 
rate needs to decrease from 10 MHz to 100 kHz [14].  Methods such as data compression 
and data truncation need to be applied to reduce the data rate. 
d. Discussion About Jam Resistance 
As can be seen to enhance jam resistance for the data link, antennas, 
communication equipment and power generators may need to be replaced.  Weight, 
space, and power constraints of the UA are drivers for an airborne data terminal on the 
UA.  The GCS, on the other hand, has less of such constraints, though antenna size and 
pointing requirements may have an impact on the configuration of the station. 
e. Reducing Impact of Data Link Jamming 
It is unlikely that the UA will be jammed everywhere all the time.  There 
will be windows of opportunity for the data terminals to transmit.  If UAS is not able to 
resist jamming by the adversary, operating policies can be changed to allow UAS to 
operate in a degraded mode when jamming occurs.  When the data link is jammed, the 
UA may continue to perform its pre-programmed mission profiles and record all sensor 
data onboard the UA.  This data can then be sent when jamming stops or the effects of 
jamming decreases.  Alternatively, the UA can bring the data home on tape.  A recorder 
needs to be installed on existing UAs to record the data.  Software may need to be 
modified to allow the UA to perform missions autonomously.  This option, however, is 
not feasible if the mission requires real-time information. 
                                                 
5 A measure of the amount of jammer power the data link can tolerate before its performance becomes 
unacceptable. 
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4. Resistance to Deception 
Deception is arguably more damaging than jamming as it can lead to the loss of 
the UA, while jamming typically only denies the performance of a particular mission.  
The UA only needs to be tricked into accepting one catastrophic command such as 'stop 
engine', 'pitch down' (to crash into the ground), etc.  An operator can also be tricked to 
crash the UA when the adversary successfully sends false status signals showing that the 
UA is climbing, causing the operator to command the UA to descend. 
Resistance to deception can be provided by authentication codes and some of the 
techniques that provide resistance to jamming, such as spread-spectrum transmission 
using secure codes.  The advantage of using authentication codes is that it can be 
implemented without installing any new equipment.  Codes can be generated and verified 
by the system computers.  Only the software needs to be modified for the computers to 
perform this task. 
E. OPERATOR 
Another important component of UAS is the human operator.  It is no surprise 
that human factors affect the combat survivability of UAS.  As an example, as high as 17 
percent of UAS accidents during OEF and OIF were due to human factors [48].  Seventy-
one percent of Predator accidents between 2003 and 2006 could be attributable to human 
errors [49].  Though UA operators are not placed in immediate danger as the UA is 
executing its mission, they often see the gruesome details of how an adversary was taken 
out (used to be something only soldiers who were involved in close combats got to see).  
UA operators therefore are subject to combat stresses too [50].  Combat stresses and 




ensure safe handing over of UA control from one set of crew to another6, limited 
situational awareness due to operator controlling the UA remotely, etc. have led to 
numerous accidents. 
In order to enhance UAS combat survivability, these issues need to be overcome.  
More training, better counter-checks, more crew rotations, etc. may be solutions to some 
of the human factor issues.  As human factor issues are solved, the likelihood of human 
factor-related accidents will decrease and thus improve combat survivability. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Due to the wide range of sizes and performances of UAs, a standard “one size fits 
all” solution to UA combat survivability is not available.  Many of the combat 
survivability enhancement options can only be implemented on the larger UAs. 
Combat survivability enhancement options have been identified to include 
changing tactics (increasing the operating altitude or changing the operating speed of the 
UA), improving situational awareness of the operator (installing threat warning systems), 
equipping the UA to counter incoming threats, improving payload performances, 
improving the data link resistance to jamming and deception, and solving human factor 
issues.  A proposed process for selecting the “best” combat survivability enhancement 
solution is presented next. 
                                                 
5 The National Transportation Safety Board reported that on the April 26, 2006, a Predator B crashed 
due to poor human factors when a UA control was switched.  According to the report, when the pilot was 
switching from one console to another, he inadvertently cut off UAS’s fuel supply.  When the switch was 
made, a lever on the second console remained in a position that would cut off the fuel supply if the console 
was used to control the aircraft.  Although procedures required that the controls on the two consoles be 
matched prior to making such a switch, this procedure was not followed.  
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VII. SELECTING COMBAT SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
SOLUTIONS FOR AN EXISTING UAS 
UAS combat survivability is a balance of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 
tactics, technology, and cost for a given threat environment [7].  There is a need to 
balance between making UAS survivable and meeting other UAS objectives.  This is 
demonstrated in the failure of the RQ-3 DarkStar program.  The RQ-3 DarkStar was 
designed with stealth design to make it highly survivable.  It was optimized to perform 
missions in heavily defended areas.  The DarkStar was to complement the RQ-4 Global 
Hawk.  The Global Hawk was designed to be moderately survivable and optimized to 
perform missions that required long range and endurance but in a low-to-moderate threat 
environment. 
In an attempt to meet its cost objective of a $10 million flyaway price (which it 
failed to meet eventually), performance was traded.  The DarkStar has shorter range and 
endurance than the Global Hawk (9 hours at 500 nm versus 24 hours at 1200 nm).  The 
data link on the DarkStar has less bandwidth than the Global Hawk.  The DarkStar can 
only carry either the radar or the EO payload at any time, while the Global Hawk can 
carry both payloads simultaneously.  Both of the DarkStar’s payloads also have slightly 
less capability than the Global Hawk’s payloads.  The resultant DarkStar design traded 
performance for survivability. 
The DarkStar program was eventually cancelled for reasons that included its 
performance shortfall outweighing the perceived value of its enhanced survivability.  
Given a trade-off between survivability and performance, the USAF chose the 
performance of the Global Hawk over the Dark Star’s survivability.   
Among the many reasons for operating a UAS (versus manned aircraft) are that 
UAs typically have longer range and endurance and lower operating costs.  The 
performance and cost of UAS should not be traded for combat survivability by so much 
so that the shortfall outweighs the perceived value of the combat survivability (as in the 
case of the DarkStar program).  A balance between the requirements must be achieved. 
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A process is therefore needed to be put in place to help decide whether it is 
necessary to enhance the combat survivability of an existing UAS and, if necessary, 
which combat survivability enhancement feature(s) to select. 
A. ESTABLISH THE NEED TO ENHANCE COMBAT SURVIVABILITY 
First, the need for enhancing combat survivability of UAS has to be established.  
The need is dependent upon many factors.  It includes the types of mission to be 
accomplished, the criticality of these mission(s), the threats encountered by UAS in its 
operating environment, and the number of UAS available, taking into account the UA as 
well as the payload.  UAS with minimum combat survivability features may be sufficient 
to perform non-critical missions in low threat environments.  If a large fleet of 
expendable UAS is available, missions can still be accomplished at lower life-cycle costs, 
even if one or more of the less survivable assets is destroyed.  However, if UAS is to 
perform critical missions in a high threat environment, better combat survivability may 
be required.  Likewise, if few UAS are available, every UAS is more valuable to the 
mission, and therefore it is more important that UAS can survive the hostile environment. 
The need to enhance combat survivability of an existing UAS may also be based 
primarily on economic considerations.  There can be a trade-off done between 
replacement cost and cost of enhancing the combat survivability.  The replacement cost 
should include both the actual cost of UAS components being replaced and logistic costs 
incurred to carry out the replacement.  Ignoring any other factor, it makes perfect 
economic sense to adopt the lower cost option. 
Another factor to consider is the life span of UAS.  If UAS is near the end of its 
life span, it may not be worthwhile to enhance its combat survivability as there is little 
number of years left to reap the benefit.  Inputs to help determine the need for enhancing 
combat survivability of UAS should be solicited from the customers.  The customers 




Questions that can help establish the need include: 
• What is the type of mission(s) conducted by UAS?  How critical are these 
missions?  What is the contribution of UAS to overall mission success? 
• What is the type of threat UAS will face in its area of operations?  What is the 
threat level in the area of operations? 
• What is the current combat survivability of UAS?  Are current combat 
survivability features of UAS sufficient to counter the threat? 
• How is the combat survivability of UAS affecting overall mission success?  Is 
it acceptable?  Considering the attrition rate, are there sufficient UAS to 
perform the missions? 
• What is the cost of replacing destroyed components of UAS? 
• Is it better7 to procure more of the same UAS without enhancing the combat 
survivability, or is it better to enhance the combat survivability?  
Alternatively, will it be better to use a different type of UAS, which may be 
cheaper but more in numbers or is more survivable, to perform the mission? 
• How many years are left of UAS lifespan?  Is the number of serviceable life 
left for UAS justifiable for a survivable enhancement? 
B. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
After determining the need for combat survivability enhancement, the next steps 
are to (1) identify possible top-level approaches that can meet the need; (2) evaluate the 
approaches in terms of effectiveness, impact on the existing UAS,  maintenance and 
sustaining support requirements, associated risk (technological, schedule, program, etc.), 
and life-cycle costs; and (3) select the preferred approach [51].  It is possible to have 
more than one approach selected.  Designs based on the selected approach(s) will be 
developed and evaluated further down the process. 
It is important that all alternatives are included in the analysis even if it seems 
unlikely that these alternatives will prove to be feasible.  This is because alternatives that 
are not considered can not be adopted, regardless of how desirable they may be, so it is 
better to consider many alternatives than to overlook one that may be good. 
                                                 
7 The definition of “better” is dependent on the measurement used by the decision maker.  It can be in 
terms of cost, in which case, the cheaper the solution is, the better it is.  It can also be in terms of time 
required to implement a solution versus urgency of the problem; if it is important to have a solution as soon 
as possible, the “better” solution may be the one that requires a shorter implementation time. 
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C. IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES AND DEFINE REQUIREMENTS 
The next step is to identify objectives and define the requirements8 for enhancing 
combat survivability.  The objectives are to be solicited from the customers.  
Requirements are then defined based on the objectives. 
There may be numerous different objectives identified.  The integrator/designer 
and project manager need to know which objective is more important than the others.  
This is especially necessary if a trade-off or compromise must be made in order to meet a 
higher-level requirement.  A tool that can be used to help establish and prioritize the 
requirements is the analytic hierarchy process (AHP).  The AHP provides a framework to 
relate the requirements to the overall goals (objectives).  The AHP can facilitate the 
prioritization of the set of requirements and gives the relative weights of each 
requirement.  These weights aid the selection of enhancement solutions later in the 
process. 
Technical measures are to be developed so as to estimate, predict, and/or measure 
the system performance and effectiveness.  Technical measures provide insights into the 
progress of defining and developing the design, assessment of associated risks, and the 
degree of meeting the objectives.  These insights help project managers make better 
decisions to increase the probability of delivering a design that meets the needs and 
requirements.  Such insights also aid decisions when trade-offs are to be made [52]. 
Technical measures include measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of 
performances (MOP), and technical performance measures (TPM). 
Some MOEs include: 
• Loss rate 
• UA endurance and range 
• Coverage over target area 
• Availability 
                                                 
8 Objectives are goals while requirements are important attributes or characteristics of the system.  For 
example, the objective of enhancing the survivability of a UAS is so that the UA can survive a hostile 
environment.  The requirement for this is that the UA must have a probability if hit of less than 1%. 
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D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In order to identify all the resources (or physical components) necessary for the 
system to accomplish its mission, a functional analysis is performed.  A function is a 
specific or discrete action (or a series of actions) that is necessary to achieve a given 
objective [51].  A functional analysis is an iterative process.  It breaks the system level 
function into its constituent parts, and the constituent parts into their respective 
constituent parts, so on and so forth until a level whereby the input design criteria and/or 
constraints for the various elements of the system can be identified.  The functional 
analysis presents an overall integrated and composite description of the system’s 
functional architecture, and provides a foundation from which all physical resource 
requirements are identified and justified. 
A functional analysis also ensures that only necessary resources are considered 
and no unnecessary resources are requested.  This is especially important to UAS with 
weight and power constraints.  Only combat survivability enhancement features that are 
applicable to the likely threat environment should be considered.  For example, the RQ-
4A Global Hawk flying at 65,000 ft has minimal exposure to surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM) that uses IR for guidance.  SAM threats at such a high altitude mostly use radar 
for guidance.  For combat survivability, the aircraft's modular self-defense system, 
therefore, includes only an AN/ALR 89 radar warning receiver, an on-board jamming 
system, and an ALE 50 towed decoy system [53], but no IR countermeasures.  By not 
installing unnecessary combat survivability features, more payload volume and electrical 
power can be allocated to its payload sensors. 
E. FUNCTIONAL AND REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION 
Having identified all the resources needed for the system to accomplish its 
mission, the next step is to map all functions to physical components.  In order to save 
weight, size, and (hopefully) cost, similar or closely related functions may be packaged 
together to employ common resources.  For example, the function of releasing flares can 
be grouped together with the function of releasing chaffs and allocated to the mission 
computer. 
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When allocating functions to physical components, different design approaches 
that can satisfy a given functional requirement are to be evaluated.  Trade-off studies are 
to be performed.  A function may be performed by various components (hardware, 
software, human, etc., and/or their combinations).  A proper mix is to be chosen. 
Top-level requirements defined earlier are also to be broken down and allocated 
to the individual components.  For example, if an EW system consisting of a MWS 
subsystem and flare dispensers requires an operational availability (Ao) of 90%, the 
MWS subsystem will require an Ao of 94% while the dispensers will require 96% Ao. 
F. EVALUATE COMBAT SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT SOLUTIONS 
Having justified the needs, identified the components required, and allocated 
functions and requirements to each component, the next step is to look for and evaluate 
combat survivability enhancement solutions.  Each solution may incorporate one or more 
combat survivability enhancement features.  For example, one solution may simply 
propose applying radar energy absorbent paint over the UA while another solution may 
propose installing a RWR system and a towed RF decoy system instead. 
Depending on criticality, urgency, and budget allocated to enhance combat 
survivability, solutions of varying technical maturity can be sought.  If the enhancement 
is to be implemented in the shortest possible time, existing enhancement features should 
be sought.  However, if the requirement is not urgent and there is sufficient budget 
allocated, features utilizing developing technology can be sought. 
If an enhancement solution does not negatively affect performance, maintenance, 
cost, weight, or any other UAS attributes, it should be adopted.  However, if the solution 
affects one or more of these attributes, further study is required.  The pros and cons of 
each solution are to be studied.  Factors to consider include (1) effectiveness of the 
solution; (2) how the solution will affect UAS performance, reliability, maintainability, 
supportability and system safety; (3) cost of the solution; and (4) schedule. 
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1. Effectiveness of Solution 
It is important that the effectiveness of the solution in enhancing combat 
survivability is assessed as an ineffective feature installed is a deadweight (excess 
baggage) to UAS.  The definition of effectiveness is dependent on the success criteria set 
by the customer.  MOEs are used to measure the effectiveness.  MOEs will allow the 
evaluation of the degree of combat survivability enhancement each features achieves.  
Various alternatives can then be compared.  Methods to measure the effectiveness of each 
feature in enhancing combat survivability include engineering studies, actual testing, 
modeling, and simulation. 
2. UAS Performance 
It is very likely that the enhancement solution will affect the performance of 
existing UAS.  For example, installing a RWR system onto the UA will increase the 
UA’s weight and may increase the fuel consumption, resulting in a decrease in the UA’s 
endurance, and encrypting the data link to increase communication security leads to a 
decrease in data rate.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there is a need to 
balance the requirement for combat survivability with the requirement for performance.  
If implementing the combat survivability solution will adversely affect mission 
effectiveness, UAS may be better off without the enhancement.  Surviving the hostile 
environment without performing the mission is probably worse than accomplishing the 
mission but not surviving the hostile environment. 
3. Reliability 
Reliability is the ability of UAS to perform its required functions for the required 
duration.  The introduction of combat survivability enhancement features may affect the 
reliability of UAS.  When components are added as part of a combat survivability 
enhancement, additional sources of failures are introduced into UAS.  The overall 
reliability of UAS will be degraded.  However, if the failures of these new components 
are isolated and do not lead to secondary failures on existing components in UAS, the 
current mission reliability is not affected. 
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Reliability also affects the logistic burden.  A UAS with poor reliability will 
require more spares and more frequent maintenance (both corrective and preventive).  
This puts a strain on logistics support, operational effectiveness, and mission planning.  It 
is therefore important that the benefits of combat survivability enhancements outweigh 
the effect on UAS reliability. 
4. Maintainability 
The addition of combat survivability enhancement features to an existing UAS 
will affect the maintenance requirements of the system.  In most cases the maintenance 
labor-hour requirements for the system will likely increase.  For example, more 
preventive and corrective maintenance requirements can be expected when EW 
equipment is added to UAS.  The opposite case may exist too.  When components are 
reduced as part of an effort to reduce vulnerability or combat survivability is enhanced 
through software changes (i.e., encrypting the data link), the maintenance man-hour 
requirements may actually drop.  The enhancement must not affect UAS maintainability 
so negatively that the cost outweighs the benefits of a combat survivability enhancement. 
5. Supportability 
A UAS requires logistic support in order to perform its missions.  UAS requires 
fuel to operate, spares to replace failed components, GSE to launch and recover the UA, 
etc.  It is necessary to assess the impact of combat survivability enhancement solutions on 
UAS supportability.  For example, installing a RWR system onto the UA will increase 
the UA’s weight and may increase the fuel consumption; this implies that more fuel will 
be needed to bring the UA to the operating base.  This may cause a strain on the logistic 
chain.  The gains from combat survivability enhancements have to outweigh the logistic 
burden added onto UAS. 
6. System Safety 
Probable change in UAS system safety by survivable enhancement solutions must 
also be assessed.  In some cases, combat survivability enhancements (such as reducing 
vulnerability) may improve the system safety of UAS.  For example, a fire suppression 
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system in the fuel systems can reduce the likelihood of the UA being destroyed by fire 
caused by both a natural and man-made hostile environment.  However, in many other 
cases, the solution actually degrades the system safety.  Once flare dispensers are 
installed on the UA, there is likelihood that operators may inadvertently release flares 
over cities.  Any new hazards created by the implementation of the combat survivability 
enhancement solution must be identified and the associated risks must be reduced as 
much as possible to an acceptable level. 
7. Dollar Cost 
The financial costs may be one factor that all trade-offs are based on.  The budget 
is not limitless.  If necessary, trade-offs in either performance or schedule are usually 
done in order to meet the budget.  A cost analysis should be performed to estimate/predict 
the total cost of ownership (TCO).  The TCO includes acquisition cost, integration cost, 
operation and support (O&S) cost (for both peacetime and wartime operations), and 
disposal cost.  O&S cost typically accounts for the largest portion of the total cost [54]. 
The implementation of the combat survivability enhancement solution may 
increase the TCO of each UAS, but it also reduces the attrition rate of UAS.  This implies 
that less UAS are needed to accomplish the same mission objectives.  From a fleet-wide 
perspective, the overall cost of equipping, operating, supporting, and disposing of UAS 
may actually be lower.  The cost of combat survivability enhancements may be greatly 
exceeded by the cost of UAS attrition. 
8. Schedule/Time Line 
The estimated time taken to develop and implement the combat survivability 
enhancement solutions has to be assessed too.  Only solutions with acceptable timelines 
should be considered.  As contractors may provide excessively optimistic schedules, it is 
also important to assess the likelihood of contractors meeting their schedules. 
Questions that may help in the evaluation of combat survivability enhancement 
solutions include: 
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• Is each solution applicable to the threat?  How effective is each solution with 
respect to the threat? 
• How will each combat survivability enhancement solution affect the operators 
in terms of workload, situation awareness, qualification required, etc? 
• How will the combat survivability enhancement solution affect the UA 
performance in terms of its range, endurance, altitude, speed, agility, handling 
characteristics, balance and stability, loading on the airframe, electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) and compatibility (EMC) with other components, amount 
of payload the UA can carry, payload performance, electrical loading, 
communication between the UA and GCS, etc? 
• How will the combat survivability enhancement solution affect the GCS 
performance in terms of EMI and EMC with other components, 
communication between the UA and GCS, mobility of the mobile control 
station, power loading, etc? 
• How much modification (both hardware and software) on the existing UAS is 
required?  Is the complexity of the modification and associated risk 
acceptable?  Is the length of time required for the modification acceptable? 
• How will the combat survivability enhancement solution affect the support 
structure of UAS?  Areas to be considered include spares requirements, 
requirements on technicians, additional GSE required, reliability and 
availability of UAS, etc. 
• How will the combat survivability enhancement solution affect the system 
safety aspect of UAS?  Have all hazards been identified?  Can all associated 
safety risks be reduced to acceptable levels? 
• What are the acquisition costs, operating and support costs, integration costs, 
etc. associated with implementing the enhancement?  Are the costs 
acceptable? 
• What are the risks associated with the combat survivability enhancement 
solution?  Are the customer and/or the program manager willing to undertake 
the risk? 
G. SELECTING THE COMBAT SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
 SOLUTION 
After evaluating each alternative combat survivability enhancement solution, it is 
now necessary to select the “best” solution.  A benefit-cost analysis (BCA) can be 
performed to help select the “best” solution. 
For the BCA, the net perceived benefit of the each solution is first determined.  
The net benefit is the advantage that the solution provides minus the burden (other than 
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cost) that the operator will have to bear for implementing the solution.  For example, 
installing a RWR system on the UA gives the benefit of improving the operator’s 
situational awareness; however, this also increases the logistic burden as the RWR 
system has to be maintained, the threat library has to be updated, etc.  There are many 
techniques to measure the perceived benefits, which include using the AHP or modeling 
and simulation.   
The definition of “best” depends on the customer’s top criteria for enhancing 
UAS combat survivability.  The customer may be asking for the most cost-effective 
solution, the solution with the least operational impact to the existing system, the solution 
with minimal cost, or the most beneficial solution that is within the budget, etc. 
To identify the most cost-effective solution, the relative benefit of each solution is 
divided by its cost.  The solution that gives the highest ratio (most benefit for each dollar 
invested) is the “best” solution. 
A sensitivity study is also to be conducted on the benefit assessment to examine 
the stability of the decision due to changes in the variables (assigned weights and life-
cycle cost elements).  The resultant relative benefit ratios are then plotted in the benefit-
cost chart.  A more deliberate trade-off between benefit and cost assessment can then be 
made before recommending the most cost-effective system. 
H. EXAMPLE 
A UAS with very few combat survivability features incorporated in its original 
design has become a candidate for combat survivability enhancement when its potential 
adversary upgraded its air defense capability.  The selection process discussed earlier in 
this chapter will be used to determine the need to enhance combat survivability of UAS 
and to select the “best” solution.  Unless otherwise stated, figures quoted in this section 
are fictitious. 
UAS consists of one UA, one GCS, and other ground support elements.  Its 
primary missions are ISR missions.  The UA typically operates at medium altitude 
(10,000 to 15,000 ft) and has long endurance of about 20 hours.  It is a MALE class UA  
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and is capable of carrying only one payload at a time.  The primary mission payload 
consists of IMINT sensors such as FLIR and day TV, and SAR.   
The GCS is in a shelter mounted on truck, which gives it mobility.  The GCS and 
other ground support elements will likely be located away from the reach of the adversary 
threat.  The data link between the UA and the GCS has a low probability of intercept and 
employs encryption techniques that ensure the security of the communication.  The 
likelihood of the adversary jamming the data link or successfully employing deception 
techniques on the data link is minimal. 
1. Establishing Needs 
The first step is to establish the need to enhance the combat survivability of UAS.  
The need to enhance combat survivability of UAS depends on, among many other 
factors, the types of missions to be accomplished, the criticality of these missions and the 
importance of UAS to these missions, the threat encountered by UAS in its operating 
environment, and current combat survivability. 
a. Importance of UAS 
UAS has become an important part of the defense doctrine.  Commanders 
recognize the value of persistence surveillance made possible by the long endurance of 
the UA.  The demand for UA flights has increased over the years.  Coupled with the 
limited size of UAS fleet, it has become paramount that UAS survives hostile 
environments.  
b. Threat 
The adversary has recently acquired a new long-range radar system that is 
able to detect UAs from a longer distance.  The adversary is also equipped with EO 
detectors that can identify and track the UA passively.  UAS operator will not know that 
his or her UA is being tracked until the adversary shoots it down. 
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The adversary’s hard-kill options consist of an arsenal of AAA, SAMs 
(both IR-guided and radar-guided), and aircraft that are capably of shooting the UA 
down.  The AAA is effective up to about 10,000 ft.  Some of the SAMs can reach 15,000 
ft and above. 
It has been assessed that the effectiveness of the adversary’s soft-kill 
options is very limited.  The probability that the adversary is able to locate GCS using 
radio direction-finding techniques is low, and it is unlikely that the adversary can jam the 
data link successfully.  The adversary is also not known to possess the capability to 
launch EMP attacks. 
c. Current Combat Survivability 
Campaign models and simulations show that with the new threat from the 
adversary’s radar, the loss rate for UAS is 0.05 kills for every 1,000 hours of operations.  
Considering how limited the size of UAS fleet is, this loss rate is deemed to be too high.  
Any loss is also assessed to be too expensive in terms of financial cost.  There is 
definitely a need to enhance the combat survivability of UAS. 
2. Feasibility Study 
This is the step where possible top-level approaches to meet the needs are 
identified, assessed, and selected.  To aid the identification of top-level approaches for 
consideration, shortcomings of UAS are first identified.  The rationale is that to enhance 
combat survivability, one or more of these shortcomings should be remedied.  One 
effective way to identify these shortcomings is to see things from the adversary’s points 
of view.  A team of experts can be gathered to play the role of the adversary to 
brainstorm how they will attack UAS and why they will do so.  These reasons are UAS 
shortcomings.  The same or another team of experts will then brainstorm on possible 
remedies to these shortcomings.  These remedies are the top-level approaches to consider.  





Table 8.   UAS Shortcoming And Possible Remedies 
UAS Shortcoming Possible Remedy 
Noisy  
• The propeller propulsion system is the 
main source of noise 
• Its presence can be detected from a great 
distance (especially if it is flying low) 
• Provide thrust without using propellers 
• Minimize noise  
• Divert noise to travel away from 
adversary 
Slow  
• The slow speed makes killing it easy 
with a large array of weapons 
• Increase speed of the UA 
• Reduce probability of detection of the 
UA 
Not agile  
• Can easily kill with aircraft, SAMs, and 
AAA 
• Improve on the agility of the UA 
• Strengthen the UA’s tolerance to damage 
• Reduce probability of detection of UA 
Needs to fly low below clouds to obtain 
images 
 
• Can easily kill with AAA 
• Can easily kill with SAMs 
• Upgrade the UA with the capability to 
see through clouds 
• Remove the clouds 
• Reduce the probability of detection of 
the UA such that it can not be detected 
even though it flies low 
Operator has limited situational 
awareness 
 
• Operator has limited awareness (visual, 
aural, IR, and electronically) of what is 
happening around the UA 
• Can attack the UA from the direction that 
it is not seeing (sneak attack), especially 
when it is using its only optical sensor to 
perform a mission 




UAS Shortcoming Possible Remedy 
UA can not escape or fight back when 
attacked 
 
• UA has no means to shoot back at 
attacker 
• UA does not have a soft-kill option 
(jamming, countermeasure, etc.) against 
the adversary 
• Increase speed and/or agility of the UA 
• Equip the UA with the capability to 
counter incoming threats 
UA can not survive a hit  
• UA has no armor and therefore missile 
fragments or rounds can easily penetrate 
skin and damage critical components  
• UA has no fire suppression system to 
reduce damage when hit 
• Strengthen damage tolerance 
Will not be able to navigate as accurately 
if GPS is jammed 
 
• UA depends on GPS for navigation, 
therefore once GPS is jammed the UA 
will either need to navigate with 
degraded mode or not be able to navigate 
at all, which means that it will not be 
able to reach its target area;  jamming 
GPS will disrupt other systems too (not 
only UAS), therefore from adversary's 
POV, this is very attractive 
• Protect the GPS navigation system 
• Provide an alternative navigation system 
Will fail the mission if the GCS is 
destroyed 
 
• UA is dependent on the GCS to fly the 
mission, so destroying the GCS means 
killing the UA too 
• UA needs to transmit what it sees to 
some station so that it can be interpreted 
and made useful; if the GCS is 
destroyed, whatever info the UA 
gathered will be useless as there is no 
one on the other side to receive the 
transmission 
• Reduce the UA’s dependence on the 
GCS 
• Reduce the likelihood of an adversary 
locating the GCS 





UAS Shortcoming Possible Remedy 
Will be lost if there is no way to recover 
the UA (i.e., runway destroyed) 
 
• UA cannot fly indefinitely;  If adversary 
can destroy means of recovering the UA, 
the UA will eventually be lost  
• Provide an alternative recovery system or 
method 
Will fail mission if sensor is destroyed as 
it only has one sensor 
 
• Since the UA has little redundancy, 
especially the mission’s sensor, if 
adversary can destroy or degrade sensor 
performance, the UA will not be able to 
perform its mission 
• Strengthen the sensor tolerance to 
damage 
Susceptible to EMP  
• UAS has little protection against nuclear 
EMP or high power microwave EMP 
• Minimize susceptibility of UAS to EMP 
Is not able to react to a situation without 
operator's input 
 
• Will fail the mission when data link with 
the GCS is lost, so the adversary can jam 
the signal, destroy the rebroadcast station 
(if it does not depend on LOS 
communications), etc. 
• Reduce the UA’s dependence on the 
operator 
• Improve on the data link’s resistance to 
jamming 
Depends on communication link with the 
GCS 
 
• Will fail the mission when 
communication link with the GCS is lost 
• The GCS can be detected using 
direction-finding equipment and attacked 
using artillery, anti-radiation munitions, 
etc. 
• Link can be intercepted and exploited, 
deceived, and jammed (intentionally and 
unintentionally) 
• Improve on communication security 
• Provide an alternative communication 
channel 
• Reduce the data link’s probability of 
intercept 
• Improve the data link’s resistance to 
jamming 
Operator can only see what the UA sees  
• Blind sensor -> operator can not perform 
mission 
• Strengthen the sensor's tolerance to 
damage 
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UAS Shortcoming Possible Remedy 
• Feed false signal to sensor -> operator 
"sees" what adversary wants him to see 
• Improve the resistance to deception by 
an adversary 
Ground support facilities not well 
defended 
 
• Can be easily attacked 
• usually has least redundant component, 
therefore cannot be replaced easily 
• Strengthen the defense of the ground 
element 
• Reduce the probability of detection of 
the ground element 
• Move the ground element to outside 
 
a. Feasibility 
All the top-level approaches to combat survivability enhancements are 
considered and evaluated for their feasibility.  Factors considered included effectiveness 
of the approach to enhance UAS combat survivability, possible impact the approach 
would have on the existing UAS,  maintenance and sustaining support requirements, 
associated risk (technological, schedule, program, etc.), and life-cycle costs. 
In this example, it is determined that improving the operator’s situational 
awareness and equipping the UA with the capability to counter incoming threats are 
feasible approaches to enhancing the combat survivability of UAS.  It is also assessed 
that it is technologically possible to equip the UA within an acceptable timeline while 
keeping the cost within budget.  Combat survivability can be enhanced without affecting 
much mission effectiveness. 
3. Objectives and Requirements Defined 
The objective is identified as to enhance UAS combat survivability without 
sacrificing much performance.  Keeping the objective in mind, quantitative and 
qualitative requirements for the combat survivability enhancement solution are 
developed.  The requirements include: 
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• Effectiveness: The UA loss rate must decrease from 0.05 kills for every 1,000 
hours of operations to at least 0.03 
• UAS Performance: The maximum endurance of the UA should be at least 15 
hours 
• Compatibility: The combat survivability enhancement solution should have 
minimal interfere with the operation and performance of existing payload 
• Availability: The inherent availability of UAS should be at least 85% 
AHP is used to priorities the various requirements.  The resultant weightages are 
used when selecting the enhancement solutions later in the process.  Figure 24 shows the 
comparison matrix for the requirements. 
 Effectiveness Performance Compatibility Availability Weights
Effectiveness  3 2 3 0.4314 
Performance   1/3 3 0.1776 
Compatibility    2 0.2807 
Availability     0.1102 
Figure 24.   AHP Comparison Matrix for the Requirements. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 24, it is most important to decrease the UA loss rate, 
followed by the combat survivability enhancement solution being compatible with the 
payload, followed by the effect of the solution on the UA’s maximum range, and lastly 
the effect on the UA’s operating altitude. 
The primary MOE developed for the objective is loss rate.  Loss rate is defined 
here as the number of UAs killed per 1,000 hours of operation. 
4. Functional Analysis 
The function of countering an incoming threat is next decomposed to identify all 
resources or physical components needed to accomplish the task.  The decomposition of 
the function “to counter an incoming threat” and the associated physical components for 




include humans.  As can be seen in the figure, many functions require the same physical 
component.  This provides the opportunity to package multiple functions together to 
employ the same component. 
 
Table 9.   Functional Decomposition of “To Counter Incoming Threat” and Physical 
Component Identification 
 Function Physical Components 
1.0 To Counter an Incoming Threat  
1.1.0  Detect and identify an incoming threat  
1.1.1   Provide coverage in the direction that 
the threat will likely come from 
RWR, MWS, LWS 
1.1.2   Differentiate the threat from the 
background 
System computer or operator 
1.1.3   Identify the type of threat and the 
tracking method used by the threat 
System computer or operator 
1.1.4   Measure the position of the threat RWR, MWS, LWS, and system 
computer or operator 
1.1.5   Identify the weakness of the threat System computer or operator 
1.2.0  Determine course-action  
1.2.1   Assess options System computer or operator 
1.2.2   Select a course of action System computer or operator 
1.3.0  Employ a counter-action  
1.3.1   Determine time to act System computer or operator 
1.3.2   Act to counter An actor that can counter the threat 
by jamming, deceiving, killing the 
threat, etc. (e.g., chaff, RF jammer, 
RF deceiver, RF decoy, flare 
dispensing system, IR deceiver, IR 
jammer, laser countermeasure, 
anti-air missiles, anti-radiation 
missiles) 
1.3.3   Determine the degree of action System computer or operator 
1.3.4   Determine the UA maneuver to adopt System computer or operator 
1.4.0  Logistic support  
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 Function Physical Components 
1.4.1   Update the threat library Intelligence agency supports UAS 
1.4.2   Maintain the combat survivability 
enhancement solution 
Maintainers 
1.4.3   Provide logistic support for the 
combat survivability enhancement 
solution 
Logicians 
1.0 To Counter Incoming Threat  
1.1.0  Detect and Identify incoming threat  
1.1.1   Provide coverage in direction that 
threat will likely come from 
RWR, MWS, LWS 
1.1.2   Differentiate threat from background System computer or operator 
1.1.3   Identify type of threat and tracking 
method used by threat 
System computer or operator 
1.1.4   Measure position of threat RWR, MWS, LWS, and System 
computer or operator 
1.1.5   Identify weakness of threat System computer or operator 
1.2.0  Determine course-action  
1.2.1   Assess options System computer or operator 
1.2.2   Select course of action System computer or operator 
1.3.0  Employ counter-action  
1.3.1   Determine time to act System computer or operator 
1.3.2   Act to counter An actor that can counter the threat 
by jamming, deceiving, killing the 
threat, etc. E.g. Chaff, RF Jammer, 
RF Deceiver, RF Decoy, Flare 
dispensing system, IR Deceiver, 
IR Jammer, Laser 
Countermeasure, Anti-air missiles, 
Anti-radiation missile 
1.3.3   Determine degree of action System computer or operator 
1.3.4   Determine UA maneuver to adopt System computer or operator 
1.4.0  Logistic Support  
1.4.1   Update threat library Intelligence agency support UAS 
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 Function Physical Components 
1.4.2   Maintain combat survivability 
enhancement solution 
Maintainers 
1.4.3   Provide logistic support for combat 
survivability enhancement solution 
Logicians 
 
5. Functional and Requirement Allocation 
All functions are mapped to physical components.  Some functions are packaged 
together and mapped to the same component.  For example, the system computer or 
operator will perform the functions of differentiating a threat from background, 
identifying the type of threat, determining the course of actions, and deciding when to 
act, how much to act, and the UA maneuver to adopt as part of the counter action. 
From the above, it is found that to counter an incoming threat, a warning system, 
a computer and/or operator, an actor that can counter the threat (by jamming, deceiving, 
killing the threat, etc.), and support agents are needed.  The enhancement solution shall 
consist of all these components.  Requirements are then allocated to each of these 
components. 
6. Evaluating and Selecting Combat Survivability Enhancement 
Solutions 
Three combat survivability enhancement solutions have been proposed.  The first 
solution proposes the installation of an RWR system as the warning system and a pair of 
towed RF decoys as countermeasures.  The RWR system consists of four RF receivers, a 
signal processor, and an integrated control unit that operates the decoys too.  The total 
weight of the solution is 53 lbs.  The solution is estimated to require about 0.5 kW of 
electrical power for only the RWR to operate and 0.8 kW when the decoys are deployed. 
Solution 2 proposes the installation of an RWR system and a chaff dispenser.  The 
RWR system is to detect RF threats while the chaff is to counter RF-guided missiles or 
mask the UA from the adversary’s radars.  The solution weighs about 55 lbs and requires 
about 0.6 kW of electrical power to operate. 
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Solution 3 proposes the installation of a MWS system and a chaff and flare 
dispenser.  This solution is not limited to only RF threats, as the MWS is also capable of 
detecting IR-guided missiles.  The total system weight is about 55 lbs and requires about 
0.6 kW of electrical power to operate. 
The three combat survivability enhancement solutions are evaluated for their 
effectiveness (in reducing loss rate), compatibility (effects on the payload), and their 
effects on UA performance (in terms of endurance), and availability. 
a. Effectiveness 
The UA loss rate is an indication of the effectiveness of solution in 
enhancing UA combat survivability.  Modeling and simulation of possible operation 
scenarios allows one to measure the likely loss rate of the UA when installed with each 
different solution. 
The simulations show that UA implementing solution 1 has a loss rate of 
0.02 kills per 1,000 operation hours.  The UA implementing solution 2 has a loss rate of 
0.03 kills per 1,000 and the last configuration of UA has a kill rate of 0.01 kills per 1,000 
hours.  All solutions meet the requirement of reducing the loss rate to at least 0.03 kills 
per 1,000 operating hours.  The result is used to rank the solutions according to their 
effective.  The comparison matrix is shown in Figure 25.  As can be seen, solution 3 
ranked the highest in the effectiveness aspect, followed by solution 1 then 2. 
 Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Weights 
Solution 1  1 1/3 0.1867 
Solution 2   1/5 0.1578 
Solution 3    0.6555 




The UA endurance is used to measure the effect of the solutions on the 
performance of the UA.  Analytical models were used to compute the maximum 
endurance of the UA based on the new fuel consumption (due to the weight increase by 
the combat survivability enhancement features) and amount of fuel the UA can now 
carry.  Results show that the UA has maximum endurances of 17 hours, 16.5 hours and 
16 hours when installed with solution 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  These results are used to 
ranked the solutions in the comparison matrix in Figure 26. 
 Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Weights 
Solution 1  2 3 0.5247 
Solution 2   3 0.3338 
Solution 3    0.1416 
Figure 26.   AHP Comparison Using Performance as the Ranking Criteria. 
 
c. Compatibility 
It is important that any solution implemented is compatible with the 
payload.  Based on technical studies, there is insufficient electrical power to operate the 
sensor payload while the towed decoy is deployed (solution 1).  Depending on the 
criticality of the mission, the customer is willing to trade mission success for UA combat 
survivability.  However, solution 1 is ranked the lowest in the compatibility aspect.  
Solution 2 and 3 have no compatibility issues with the payload and therefore are ranked 






 Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Weights 
Solution 1  1/5 1/5 0.0909 
Solution 2   1 0.4545 
Solution 3    0.4545 
Figure 27.   AHP Comparison Using Compatibility as the Ranking Criteria. 
 
d. Availability 
Availability is an indication of UAS being available for mission tasking 
when it is needed.  It is required that inherent availability of UAS after implementing the 
solution should be at least 85%.  Analysis shows that the UA will have an inherent 
availability of 93% when solution 1 is implemented, 90% when solution 2 is 
implemented and 95% when solution 3 is implemented.  Figure 28 shows the ranking.  
As can be seen, solution 3, with the UA having the highest availability, is ranked the 
highest, followed by solution 1 then 2. 
 Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Weights 
Solution 1  3 1/3 0.2605 
Solution 2   1/5 0.1062 
Solution 3    0.6333 
Figure 28.   AHP Comparison Using Availability as the Ranking Criteria. 
 
e. “Best” Solution 
The evaluation result is summarized in Figure 29.  As can be seen, 
solution 3 is determined to have the most benefits to UAS combat survivability, followed 
by solution 2 and then solution 1. 
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  Weight Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 
Loss Rate 0.4314 0.1867 0.1578 0.6555 
Endurance 0.1776 0.5247 0.3338 0.1416 
Compatibility 0.2807 0.0909 0.4545 0.4545 
Availability 0.1102 0.2605 0.1062 0.6333 
Overall 0.2280 0.2666 0.5053 
Figure 29.   Overall Results 
 
Cost analysis was performed on all solutions to estimate the total cost of 
operating and supporting the solutions for UAS lifecycle.  All three solutions were 
deemed to be within the customer’s threshold. 
The customer decides to select the most beneficial solution that is deemed 
affordable.  Since all solutions are within the customer’s threshold, solution 3 is the 
“best” solution.  UAS will therefore be installed with a MWS and chaff and flare 
dispensers to enhance its combat survivability. 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A balance between the combat survivability of an existing UAS and meeting its 
other objectives must be met when enhancing its combat survivability.  This chapter 
proposed a seven-step process to help decide whether it is necessary to enhance the 
combat survivability of an existing UAS and, if necessary, which combat survivability 
enhancement feature(s) to select.  The process includes establishing the need to enhance 
combat survivability, performing a feasibility analysis of the top-level enhancement 
approaches, identifying objectives and defining requirements, performing a functional 
analysis of the enhancement approach, allocating functions and requirements to 
components, evaluating the proposed enhancement solutions, and selecting the “best” 
solution.  An example was also created to illustrate the process. 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems traditionally were designed to be inexpensive and 
dispensable.  Little consideration was given for their combat survivability.  However, as 
war fighters’ reliance on UAS grows the need for UAS to be survivable in hostile 
environments increases.  There is a need to enhance the combat survivability of existing 
UAS. 
A standard “one size fits all” solution to unmanned aircraft combat survivability is 
not available due to the wide range of sizes and performances of the UA.  Smaller UAs, 
limited by size, weight carrying capability and power, unlikely are able to support combat 
survivability enhancements that will result in adding (much) more weight and/or require 
(much) more power from the UA.  Combat survivability enhancement options are thus 
very limited for smaller UAs.  The larger UAs, on the other hand, may have more 
options.  There is a higher possibility that larger UAs can support active susceptibility 
reduction features and/or vulnerability reduction features.  Potential combat survivability 
enhancement options includes increasing a UA’s operating altitude, changing the UA’s 
operating speed, installing warning systems and/or electronic countermeasures, 
improving payload performance, reducing the data link’s probability of interception, 
increasing the data  link’s resistance to jamming, locating the ground elements outside the 
threat circle, and improving human factor issues in UAS. 
The consequences of implementing combat survivability enhancement solutions 
to existing UAS, is complicated because UAS design is usually already optimized.  There 
is little room available on UAS for the combat survivability engineer to add more or even 
swap equipment.  Numerous trade-offs may be necessary between combat survivability 
and performance, logistic burden, etc.  However, a balance must be maintained between 
making UAS more survivable and trading off the other UAS objectives.  The 
performance and cost of UAS should not be traded for combat survivability so much so 




DarkStar mistake must not be allowed to repeat.  A process must be put in place to help 
decide the necessity to enhance the combat survivability and to select the combat 
survivability enhancement solutions. 
The process begins by establishing the need to enhance UAS combat 
survivability, followed by performing a feasibility analysis to select preferred approaches.  
Once the feasibility analysis is done, the next step is to identify customers’ objectives and 
define the requirements.  This is followed by a functional analysis to identify all the 
resources (or physical components) necessary for the system to enhance UAS combat 
survivability.  The functions and lower-level requirements are then allocated to these 
resources.  Once done, all alternative combat survivability enhancement solutions are 
then evaluated and the “best” solution is selected.  Factors to consider when evaluating 
the alternatives include effectiveness of the solution in enhancing combat survivability, 
how UAS performance is affected, reliability, maintainability and supportability, how the 
solution affects system safety, the total cost of operating the solution, and finally, the 
time line required for the solution.  By following the process, the combat survivability of 
an existing UAS can be enhanced. 
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